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A comment on Hotelling’s Game, or Why Gas Stations Have Competitors Nearby. Parent comment

Re:Hotelling’s Game, or Why Gas Stations Have Competitors Ne... by eric-hu on Thursday July 28, 2011 @01:49PM (#2818005)
Interesting simulation. The braided behavior sounds like the 'equilibrium behavior' I mentioned earlier. Does this simulation also allow for taking another player's exact location, forcing a split of their market share on both sides? I imagine that's a subtle but game-changing move.

For the higher vendor numbers (3+), did you notice similar behavior when the vendor parity was the same (i.e. all even or all odd)?

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Re:Hotelling’s Game, or Why Gas Stations Have Competitors Ne... by gjm11 on Thursday July 28, 2011 @03:37PM (#2818548)
No, it doesn't allow two vendors to be in the exact same spot. The amount of trade that gets you is always exactly half-way between being just to the left and being just to the right, and can therefore only be the best option when all three of those are exactly equal, so I don't think it makes much difference.

I wondered whether parity would be a big deal, but -- purely qualitatively and by eye -- it doesn't seem like it is.

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Re:Hotelling’s Game, or Why Gas Stations Have Competitors Ne... by eric-hu on Friday July 29, 2011 @12:46AM (#2820259)
Very interesting observation.

In the 2 player case, not allowing for parity means that equilibrium would never be reached. The simulation as you programmed it would approach equilibrium as time goes to infinity, though, so I guess your model works about as well as one with parity, and is simpler. Nice.

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