Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources

Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by dmix on Thursday August 12, 2021 @10:38PM (#28164724)

iMessage isnt true E2E encryption. Apple could easily decode messages for a 3rd party if they wanted to. This has been widely discussed on HN previously. All they have to do is insert an additional private key in the two party chat, as the connection is ultimately handled centrally.

There's a very good reason Signal (and previously Whatsapp) were recommended over iMessage.

Not to mention the inability to swap iMessage off for SMS which has made it a favourite exploit target for hacking firms like NSO.

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Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by alwillis on Friday August 13, 2021 @01:52AM (#28165872)

Apple could easily decode messages for a 3rd party if they wanted to.

They don't have the keys, so how exactly would they decrypt these messages?

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Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by dmix on Friday August 13, 2021 @01:53AM (#28165884)

They would be able to decrypt messages after the point of interception, not retroactively.

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Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by jakemauer on Friday August 13, 2021 @12:45AM (#28165547)

You can turn off iMessages and force the phone to use SMS, however you can't do it on a per-contact or per-conversation basis.

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