It can target a pride flag just as easily as CP.
How many exactly? The threshold is secret, it could be 1 or 2 or maybe it is dynamic and depends on stuff like your identity.
From what I read the threshold is for a different purpose, ,the false positives are too many so to reduce the number of reports the threshold workaround is introduced, so is a hack to workaround the false positives and not a threshold to catch people with big collections.
I think a lot hinges on what you call a ‘false positive’. It could mean ‘an image that is not CSAM’ or it could mean ‘an account that has some apparent CSAM, but not enough to be evidence of anything’.
What would help me with this kind of things would be more transparency, like to know the algorithm, the threshold, the real numbers of false positives, can the hashes be set per country or individual, can independent people look inside iOS and confirm that the code works as described...
What would also help is to know for sure hoe many children were saved by this kind of system,
This is a misunderstanding of how it works. The threshold has to be met before a detection occurs. Unless the threshold is met Apple doesn’t get to know about any images.
As for independent auditing and transparent statistics, I fully agree.
Let's say the threshold is 10 , you trigger the threshold so Apple checks all the 10 images , but 9 are false possitive and one appears to be a correct match, Apple will report you for 1 image ... so my point is that is not designed to catch people with big collections of CP, is designed to not trigger to often.
Hah! Nice one :D
It’s way more complex than that, and has been engineered to prevent exactly that scenario.
I recommend you actually check out some of Apple’s material on this.
The idea that it’s just a list or fingerprints or hashes that can easily be repurposed is simply wrong, but is the root of almost all of the complaints.
I feel like you may not have actually read the paper in depth. The paper clearly shows this is a generalised solution for detecting content that perceptually matches a database. The "what" is CSAM today, but nothing about the technicals require it to be CSAM.
To answer your specific response of safety voucher and visual derivative:
- The 'safety voucher' is an encrypted packet of information containing a part of the user's decryption keys, as well as a low resolution, grayscale version of the image (visual derivative). It is better described as "backdoor voucher".
- The 'visual derivative' is just the image but smaller and grayscale.
None of those two technologies have anything to do with CSAM. Apple's statement that they will only add CSAM to the database is a policy statement. Apple can literally change it overnight to detect copyrighted content, or Snowden documents, or whatever.
> Apple can literally change it overnight to detect copyrighted content, or Snowden documents, or whatever.
No, Apple doesn’t run the database. NCMEC does.
Also, in the US, the 4th Amendment protects against the abuse you are talking about:
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2021/08/12/a-38-year...
This whole ‘now that they have a scanner it’s easier’ reasoning doesn’t make sense. iOS already had numerous better matching algorithms if your goal is to do general spying.