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Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by zepto on Thursday August 12, 2021 @09:19PM (#28164154)
Right, but the CSAM scanning routine is absurdly narrow and difficult to use for detecting anything but CSAM, whereas a general purpose hash matching algorithm really is just a few lines of code.

This whole ‘now that they have a scanner it’s easier’ reasoning doesn’t make sense. iOS already had numerous better matching algorithms if your goal is to do general spying.

Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by zionic on Thursday August 12, 2021 @09:51PM (#28164366)
This is false information, the scanning system is highly generalized to finding any type of photo via fuzzy matched perceptual hashes.

It can target a pride flag just as easily as CP.

[dead]
Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by simion314 on Friday August 13, 2021 @12:50AM (#28165574)
>A set of multiple images must match.

How many exactly? The threshold is secret, it could be 1 or 2 or maybe it is dynamic and depends on stuff like your identity.

Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by zepto on Friday August 13, 2021 @12:55AM (#28165608)
It could be 1 or 2, but the claim is that it is set to only detect people who are actually building a collection of CSAM images because Apple doesn’t want this system to flag people who are unlikely to be actual criminals. I.e. they don’t just want no false positives, they don’t want positives that aren’t highly likely to be criminal. I’m guessing it’s a lot more than 2.
Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by simion314 on Friday August 13, 2021 @01:55AM (#28165894)
> but the claim is that it is set to only detect people who are actually building a collection of CSAM

From what I read the threshold is for a different purpose, ,the false positives are too many so to reduce the number of reports the threshold workaround is introduced, so is a hack to workaround the false positives and not a threshold to catch people with big collections.

Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by zepto on Friday August 13, 2021 @02:22AM (#28166044)
I have seen both in comments from Apple. Certainly spokespeople have talked about wanting any reports to NCMEC to be actionable.

I think a lot hinges on what you call a ‘false positive’. It could mean ‘an image that is not CSAM’ or it could mean ‘an account that has some apparent CSAM, but not enough to be evidence of anything’.

Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by simion314 on Friday August 13, 2021 @03:09AM (#28166315)
I think it is clear that Apple will have no choice, if they for sure find 1 CSAM image they can't say "it is just 1 img so it is not a big collection..." they have to send it to whoever to handle it.

What would help me with this kind of things would be more transparency, like to know the algorithm, the threshold, the real numbers of false positives, can the hashes be set per country or individual, can independent people look inside iOS and confirm that the code works as described...

What would also help is to know for sure hoe many children were saved by this kind of system,

Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by zepto on Friday August 13, 2021 @11:17AM (#28169967)
> I think it is clear that Apple will have no choice, if they for sure find 1 CSAM image they can't say "it is just 1 img so it is not a big collection..." they have to send it to whoever to handle it.

This is a misunderstanding of how it works. The threshold has to be met before a detection occurs. Unless the threshold is met Apple doesn’t get to know about any images.

As for independent auditing and transparent statistics, I fully agree.

Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by simion314 on Saturday August 14, 2021 @02:04AM (#28178455)
You misunderstand my comment, maybe is my fault.

Let's say the threshold is 10 , you trigger the threshold so Apple checks all the 10 images , but 9 are false possitive and one appears to be a correct match, Apple will report you for 1 image ... so my point is that is not designed to catch people with big collections of CP, is designed to not trigger to often.

Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by zepto on Saturday August 14, 2021 @02:11AM (#28178475)
Ok, but the threshold is 30. It seems unlikely to be a problem.
Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by simion314 on Saturday August 14, 2021 @08:36AM (#28180155)
Yeah, I was commenting about the "collection" part of the comment.
Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by cf499 on Friday August 13, 2021 @05:27AM (#28167014)
"(...) but there are safeguards against that."

Hah! Nice one :D

Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by zepto on Friday August 13, 2021 @11:20AM (#28170003)
Apple have described the safeguards. If you want to claim they are lying, by all means do so.
Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by mdoms on Friday August 13, 2021 @06:51AM (#28167454)
This is pure speculation.
Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by zepto on Friday August 13, 2021 @11:19AM (#28169985)
Not one line of it is speculation. This is taken from Apple’s public docs.
Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by Wowfunhappy on Thursday August 12, 2021 @09:24PM (#28164192)
Isn't the scanning routine searching for fingerprints? What happens if someone adds a fingerprint to the database, which matches something other than CSAM?
Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by zepto on Thursday August 12, 2021 @09:39PM (#28164280)
No.

It’s way more complex than that, and has been engineered to prevent exactly that scenario.

I recommend you actually check out some of Apple’s material on this.

The idea that it’s just a list or fingerprints or hashes that can easily be repurposed is simply wrong, but is the root of almost all of the complaints.

Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by Wowfunhappy on Thursday August 12, 2021 @09:41PM (#28164297)
I've looked through Apple's paper, what are you referring to?
Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by zepto on Thursday August 12, 2021 @09:52PM (#28164377)
So you know it’s not just a fingerprint. Did you notice the parts about the safety vouchers and the visual derivatives?
Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by dannyw on Friday August 13, 2021 @04:17AM (#28166683)
Yes, I did. You do realise that CSAM is just a policy control, and there is literally nothing technical from Apple adding non-CSAM content to the same policy and systems?

I feel like you may not have actually read the paper in depth. The paper clearly shows this is a generalised solution for detecting content that perceptually matches a database. The "what" is CSAM today, but nothing about the technicals require it to be CSAM.

To answer your specific response of safety voucher and visual derivative:

- The 'safety voucher' is an encrypted packet of information containing a part of the user's decryption keys, as well as a low resolution, grayscale version of the image (visual derivative). It is better described as "backdoor voucher".

- The 'visual derivative' is just the image but smaller and grayscale.

None of those two technologies have anything to do with CSAM. Apple's statement that they will only add CSAM to the database is a policy statement. Apple can literally change it overnight to detect copyrighted content, or Snowden documents, or whatever.

Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by zepto on Friday August 13, 2021 @11:23AM (#28170041)
You are ignoring how the parts of the technology are used to separate responsibilities.

> Apple can literally change it overnight to detect copyrighted content, or Snowden documents, or whatever.

No, Apple doesn’t run the database. NCMEC does.

Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by Wowfunhappy on Friday August 13, 2021 @12:50PM (#28171375)
It doesn’t matter where the fingerprints are coming from, they’re all just fingerprints. Today they come from NCMEC. Tomorrow they could be from the Chinese Communist Party.
Re:Apple's child protection features spark concern within it... by zepto on Friday August 13, 2021 @01:08PM (#28171617)
It’s hard to take seriously the complaint that this mechanism would give the Chinese Communist party more power.

Also, in the US, the 4th Amendment protects against the abuse you are talking about:

https://www.economist.com/united-states/2021/08/12/a-38-year...