Re:Leaked voting machine BIOS passwords may implicate Q-frie...
by jd3 on Wednesday August 11, 2021 @11:45PM
(#28151612)
More recent research into auditable voting rules can be found in Rivest's Ternary Plurality Trees[0] and BatchVote[1].
It's clear, relatively secure, auditable, verifiable, and somewhat anonymous.
For those unfamiliar:
> The idea is that you xor together 3 ballots when you vote, but one of the three ballots is published.[3]
> The trick to the 3-ballot voting protocol is that not everyone can validate their vote. However, when a group of voters band together, they should be able to validate that a subset of their votes (1/3) were registered with high probability. > ... > With a sufficiently large group of voters checking results, the law of large numbers comes into play and they can statistically detect the presence of voting fraud.[4]
You would still need to trust that the poll worker is tabulating correctly and working randomly, though that's an assumption that we're already making as it is.
Scantegrity[5], Prêt à Voter[6], Helios[7], and Punchscan[8] also seem promising, though I'm not as familiar with them.
[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ThreeBallot
[1]: https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs/Riv06c.pdf
[2]: https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs/RS07.pdf
[3]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20554744
[4]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16598777
[5]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scantegrity
[6]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prêt_à_Voter
[7]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helios_Voting
[8]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Punchscan