If my mom gives me her public key, I trust that it is her public key. If my mom signs some other person's public key - I really don't know how much I trust that. Trusting that somebody is who they say they are is not the same as trusting them to properly vouch for another person.
This even leads to a logical DNS integration: debian.org advertises the core group of keys which should verify people on that address via DNS, and it shows up as "DNS-only" or something.
Good crypto frequently undermines itself by trying to be adversarial to the whole concept of government or big companies (look at TLS - it succeeded because it's the antithesis of this) but those the primary users and coordinators that can drive adoption.
I have this complaint with Signal right now: if Signal wanted a legitimate funding source, they should sell a "verified Signal" service to let companies subscribe to use Signal as an alternative to SMS providers - my father wants to do this for his small business right now, to replace the SMS bulk sender and be able to send larger files to people securely.
Instead we've got whatever cryptocurrency ridiculousness.
For the vast majority of useful communications for users, your web of trust ideally goes You -> Government ID Agency <- Recipient. And that's fine - that's what people actually need. People get scammed or deceived by faking those credentials.