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Re:Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competi... by bnj on Friday August 06, 2021 @09:11PM (#28094729)
Yes but my understanding is that the hashes are perceptual, as opposed to cryptographic.

If the system was matching against known cryptographic hashes the collision / false positive rate would be small, but the fuzzy matching involved with perceptual hashing necessarily has a greater false positive rate.

And that doesn’t even begin to address the detection of sent and received “explicit images” which are detected on device and don’t have a set of known hashes.

Re:Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competi... by fossuser on Friday August 06, 2021 @09:14PM (#28094757)
I suspect that's why they have some threshold that moves the false positive rate to one in one trillion.

The iMessage bit is different - it's only on device, only on child accounts, and only alerts parents. It's more akin to a parental control feature than anything else.

Re:Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competi... by samatman on Saturday August 07, 2021 @12:17AM (#28095646)
It was pretty dumb of Apple to announce both of these things at the same time.

They have nothing to do with each other, and I've seen a dozen people on HN confuse them. If the message is getting muddled here, it will be hopelessly conflated in less technical circles.

I'm concerned and upset about the CSAM filter for all the reasons that keep hitting the front page, but don't care about the opt-in parental controls at all, and if I had kids, I might want them.

But if I thought the CSAM filter worked like the nudie-detector filter, I'd be wigging out.

Re:Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competi... by skinkestek on Saturday August 07, 2021 @12:44PM (#28099927)
> I suspect that's why they have some threshold that moves the false positive rate to one in one trillion.

So now instead of sending just one nice innocent very high resolution images of "Tokyo City" or something with something horrific hidden somewhere you have to send a few such images.

That is reassuring. I can never believe anyone except me will think about that.

(If the system is too dumb to detect this it is worthless, and if it is smart enough this opens the floodgates for anyone wanting to make trouble for just about anyone.)

Re:Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competi... by nomel on Sunday August 08, 2021 @03:56AM (#28104982)
This would require multiple hash collisions.
Re:Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competi... by skinkestek on Monday August 09, 2021 @07:38AM (#28115453)
No need for hash collisions, that's what makes it so bad: just edit multiple known verybad images in multiple nice high res photos like I tried to explain above.
Re:Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competi... by nomel on Monday August 09, 2021 @12:22PM (#28118800)
It’s a visual hash, not something like an md5. And now you’re talking of a directed attack to intentionally make hash collisions?
Re:Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competi... by lamontcg on Saturday August 07, 2021 @02:21AM (#28096236)
It doesn't matter if the cryptographic algorithm is one in a trillion. If there's a concurrency bug in the application which applies the algorithm the wrong account could be flagged against a legitimate image in the database. If the human involved overly trusts the system they may not validate against the actual file in the users account, or may assume the user deleted it somehow and figure its "safter" to let law enforcement figure it out.

Bugs in the application of the code, combined with human complacency and mistakes can certainly lead to errors, even if the cryptographic algorithm itself was perfect.

We really need to bring back comp.risks

Re:Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competi... by bnj on Friday August 06, 2021 @10:47PM (#28095251)
This is a great point, thanks for adding that detail.