An Open Letter Against Apple's Privacy-Invasive Content Scanning Technology

Re:An Open Letter Against Apple's Privacy-Invasive Content S... by defaultname on Friday August 06, 2021 @09:44AM (#28087060)

There is a shared (among all of the major tech companies and presumably law enforcement) hash database of child abuse material. Going from a photo to the hash is deterministic: How it gets to a hash on your phone is surely the same way it gets to a hash running the exact same algorithm on the cloud, whether iCloud, Amazon Photos, etc.

Such a collision would generate a human validation.

This applies to cloud-shared files. It actually has applied to cloud shared photos for years. It applies to literally every major cloud photo service.

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Re:An Open Letter Against Apple's Privacy-Invasive Content S... by noasaservice on Friday August 06, 2021 @10:06AM (#28087319)

1. how many false positives have there been?

2. is it really reviewed by a human? I see how YT works, and automated failure at scale is the name of the game

3. apple has said that the on-device scanning only provides a binary yes/no on CP detection. How do you defend against a "yes" accusation? (when stored on someone else's server, the evidence is there)

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Re:An Open Letter Against Apple's Privacy-Invasive Content S... by dwaite on Friday August 06, 2021 @12:45PM (#28089685)

This is part of iCloud photo sync, and on hitting some threshold of matching pictures it would trigger human review.

There would also presumably be human review involved in the legal process, e.g. law enforcement getting a subpoena based on Apple notifying them, and then using gathered evidence for a warrant.

The system is based on known image hashes, not arbitrary ML detection.

As this system is used only for iCloud photo uploads, the evidence gathering should be similar to that done by LE with other cloud hosting providers for years

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