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Re:The Dangerous Ideas of “Longtermism” and “Existential Risk” by majormajor on Tuesday August 03, 2021 @05:02PM (#28054176)
> Well, just crunch the numbers: 0.00000000001 percent of 1023 people is 10 billion people, which is ten times greater than 1 billion people. This means that if you want to do the most good, you should focus on these far-future people rather than on helping those in extreme poverty today. As the FHI longtermists Hilary Greaves and Will MacAskill—the latter of whom is said to have cofounded the Effective Altruism movement with Toby Ord—write, “for the purposes of evaluating actions, we can in the first instance often simply ignore all the effects contained in the first 100 (or even 1,000) years, focussing primarily on the further-future effects. Short-run effects act as little more than tie-breakers.”

This seems ludicrous as a decision-making guideline. Why should anyone's confidence in what anything will be like in a thousand years be large? Multiply that "I'm helping billions of future people" by a "I have a one in a billion shot of actually predicting out past a thousand years correctly" instead of something like "1%" and suddenly your "short term effect tie-breaker" should return to being the dominant term in your equation.

Is this an inaccurate representation or is it really that much of a faith-based religious thing?

EDIT: it also takes you to potentially all sorts of weird places around murder/birth control/abortion. If someone is murdered before they have children, the murderer cut off their life plus untold future generations. If they use birth control or abortion to avoid having kids, they've still cut off untold future generations. The "one" aspect of that becomes insignificant if you reason about a long enough timeline purely in terms of "future potential"... I don't get it at all. Not even the extremely religious place THAT extreme a value on hypothetical potential life.

Re:The Dangerous Ideas of “Longtermism” and “Existential Risk” by wizzwizz4 on Tuesday August 03, 2021 @05:30PM (#28054481)
Yeah, I'm still not sure how ethics should work in the face of not-(yet)-extant people, either. On the one hand, setting a bomb to scorch the face of the earth once everybody currently alive is dead… seems wrong? So future people's lives will matter. But on the other, I don't see anything wrong with not having children, so hypothetical people's existence doesn't matter.
Re:The Dangerous Ideas of “Longtermism” and “Existential Risk” by drdeca on Tuesday August 03, 2021 @05:48PM (#28054651)
Why not just say that two situations where there is one more person that came into existence in one situation than the other, but everyone else’s “time in which they are alive” and “how happy/satisfied/whatever they are” are the same, are morally incomparable?

So, that way, there is neither an obligation to try to make it so there will be more people if they would be happy, nor an obligation to not do so if they wouldn’t be, but there is an obligation to, if you do make a person, to endeavor to make situations good for them?

So then, future people’s well-being matters, conditional on them existing, but without an obligation to try to influence whether they exist or in what numbers (beyond how this influences people who already do exist or who will exist regardless ).

Re:The Dangerous Ideas of “Longtermism” and “Existential Risk” by wizzwizz4 on Tuesday August 03, 2021 @06:40PM (#28055127)
But then we lose several useful mathematical properties! :-p (Thanks; I hadn't thought of that, and it's useful.)