OK, I guess it would be an improvement to record the first-used service and lock it down only to that. Still, with the old model grabbing the password still gave you access to all services; this is definitely not a degradation of security from before.
I just think people should be clear on what the keys can and cannot protect you against. You mentioned revocation -- one thing that will motivate people to do timely revokes is being aware of the potential harm of leaving these keys active after they are compromised. From what I recall of Google's setup process, they don't prominently tell people to be sure to revoke their keys in certain situations, e.g. you lose your iPhone, you lose your iPad, you lose your laptop, etc. It's easy to get the impression while activating 2-factor auth that these keys are more limited than they are and that you don't have to worry too much about them.
""" Please use your account password instead of an application-specific password. """
And obviously it will then prompt for your OTOP. Again, this is absolutely no worse than someone getting your Google Account password anyway... and even if they do, they can only use it for select things that are allowed to be used via one-time-use passwords - it's just that we happen to be discussing email and IMAP is a rather large exception. Presumably this isn't the case for other Google services.
(Uh, guys, did you have a different experience or something?)
(I'm not the one who downvoted you, by the way, so I can only guess at why.)
You can label the access key "IMAP key," but that's just the human readable label. There is no functionality tying a key to particular Google services; any key unlocks them all. There should be such functionality, which was one of the points made in this (admittedly flawed) article.
For the record, you are right when you say they don't "own" you account, since they can't change the password. But they do have broad access.