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Re:Windows Hello bypassed using infrared image by gruez on Monday July 19, 2021 @10:30PM (#27889512)
What you'd described would require each USB device to cryptographically sign its communications with an unique key. AFAIK USB doesn't have this, but thunderbolt does (it's called "secure connect"). Even if it does get implemented though, it probably won't help much because most users can be social engineered into trusting the new device.
Re:Windows Hello bypassed using infrared image by ohazi on Monday July 19, 2021 @11:05PM (#27889669)
The common USB device classes (video device, HID keyboard/mouse, etc.) don't have this, but anybody can define a new device class that does.

It seems like maybe Microsoft should have required something like this for Windows Hello cameras, if they intended for people to use the hardware as a single factor authenticator.

i.e. the camera generates internal crypto keys and tells Windows about them when you set up Windows Hello, then Windows does a challenge/response to make sure it's getting an image from the authentic camera during login attempts.

Apple did something like this with the fingerprint reader home buttons on iPhones, which is why you had to replace the motherboard + home button as a single unit on damaged devices. They could have provided a reprovisioning tool, but it's Apple, so they didn't.

Re:Windows Hello bypassed using infrared image by nasut on Tuesday July 20, 2021 @03:56AM (#27891066)
” They could have provided a reprovisioning tool, but it's Apple, so they didn't.”

They did

Re:Windows Hello bypassed using infrared image by ohazi on Tuesday July 20, 2021 @06:11AM (#27891877)
Re:Windows Hello bypassed using infrared image by djxfade on Tuesday July 20, 2021 @06:09AM (#27891862)
Source?
Re:Windows Hello bypassed using infrared image by dhx on Tuesday July 20, 2021 @04:52AM (#27891391)
There exists the USB Authentication Specification Rev. 1.0 [1] which states in section 3.3:

"A private key used by one Authentication Responder shall not be used by any other Authentication Responders. For example, one instance of a USB PD power supply cannot have the same private key as another instance of the USB PD power supply, even if they are otherwise identical model."

[1] https://usb.org/document-library/usb-authentication-specific...