Of course. I think you may have misread my original comment, which compared two philosophical perspectives on mathematics, one philosophical perspective that views mathematics as an expression of some truth beyond mathematics, and another philosophical perspective that sees mathematics as a tool to achieve some ends.

> not in some metaphysical notion of truth but in utility.

So one is not metaphysical because it is a tool to achieve ends?

(Sorry, if I come across as argumentative, I don’t mean to. I’m genuinely just curious.)

It is a metaphysical statement about whether metaphysics is important in this instant, rather than being dispensed with in favor of something useful. It's picking a particular metaphysics rather than being bogged down in the meta-metaphysical question of the necessity of metaphysics.

Or at least, that's the way I read it. The question of the value of metaphysics is an open one, which easily comes to dominate other questions if allowed to. I think the OP is saying, "I'm going to make a metaphysical commitment, and let other people worry about whether doing so is good metaphysics." (And there's good reason to think that it isn't -- but it's unclear whether that matters, or should matter.)

Yeah, I misread. Thanks for helping me understand!

For some reason you keep skipping the qualifiers in what I write. It does not say "some metaphysical notion" but "some metaphysical notion of truth". In other words, what matters isn't whether an axiom is "true" or not in some way that is external to mathematics, but what use could be made of that axiom. You did the same above; I didn't write "from a philosophical perspective" but "from a philosophical perspective where ..."

> For some reason you keep skipping the qualifiers in what I write.

My apologies, but I think I’ve understood where I misread your comment. Thanks for being patient!