AHAHAHAHAHAHAHA, at 50K a year? When they won't even sell it to institutions they don't consider proper schools? Somebody needs to re-evaluate their mission statement...
Journals that used to sell archive access to individuals for, say, $50 or $100 annually, now won't sell you a membership at all, because to save money on hosting they've moved their subscription infrastructure to JSTOR, and JSTOR refuses to sell individual subscriptions. So you end up "stealing" your access; at various times I've gotten my JSTOR access via ssh -D proxies to a friendly grad student. Now I try to return the favor by providing such access to independent scholars where needed. This sort of gaming shouldn't be necessary with a non-profit organization that is supposed to be working in the public interest, though. Hell, public domain journals from the 18th century that were scanned using public grant money are locked up behind a JSTOR paywall!
For example, the University of Maryland will let you check out books and no more.
edit: although I do agree with your point that in with the current state of things the cost per usage of JSTOR is significantly less than most other electronic journal collections
I work in this field and I can say that almost all databases and journals have IP authentication, generally with the entire campus IP range white listed. If the vendors don't implement that, they generally use password protected accounts. There are some alternatives such as uploading a list of barcodes, Referring URLs (I'm not kidding ProQuest for example allows this), Athens, Shibboleth, and a few others. These, however, are not commonly implemented by libraries because they are not widely adopted by vendors and require additional IT support that libraries simply don't have.
Therefore, unless libraries proxy all their users through their proxy servers (They don't for on-campus users. Usually, all links will go through the proxy, but if on campus the proxy will redirect you directly to the database to avoid the overhead), it would be near impossible to enforce the restriction of guests. I would wager that in many of these scenarios, it's all smoke and mirrors, and that access is really there if you know what you're doing (e.g. just visit the vendor site while on-campus without going through the library links).
And giving it away for free harms the possibilities of being an independent scholar as well. Do you seriously not understand that?
“It’s even more strange because the alleged victim has settled any claims against Aaron, explained they’ve suffered no loss or damage, and asked the government not to prosecute,” Segal added.
Sounds like instead of spending money in improving their system and security, they found a more beneficial (to their eyes) approach: charging Aaron will instead set the example.
Edit: see @mbreese's correction.
Edit 2: looks like my comment missed some important pieces of the puzzle. See further down the thread.
Here's what sometimes happens instead: The student writes and runs a clever script, the vendor notices that their servers have slowed due to automated script activity on their webpages, shuts down access from that IP address, and lets the school know. University IT staff and librarians drop what they're doing and try to track down the party responsible. Once they've been identified, the nice librarian has to have a talk with the student about what's permitted under the university's license agreement with the publisher, and together they go to the data vendor to ask forgiveness and permission. They usually get it.
Here's what Aaron did: He walked onto the MIT campus, set up a script not to analyze metadata but to actually download large numbers of documents, and when his IP was blocked, he used traditional hacking as well as Johnny Long-style "no-tech hacking" to get around it. http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-2160824376898701015
Publishers, rightly or wrongly, assume that someone systematically downloading entire journal runs is intending to set up a shadow database to give away their content for free. The feds seem to agree, in this case.
The thing that gets me is that JSTOR was more than reasonable in this case. They didn't immediately shut down the whole campus (like some overly-aggressive publishers do), but started with the IP addresses involved. When it didn't stop, they had to cut off access completely. Aaron, who isn't even a student at MIT, managed to kick the whole campus off JSTOR for weeks, and as soon as they restored access, he went at it again. If I were a librarian at MIT, I'd want the book thrown at him.
The criminal investigation and today’s indictment of Mr. Swartz has been directed by the United States Attorney’s Office
º I would probably be hesitant to say that publicly as well, considering the feds came down with a monster 35-year indictment against a juicy target. The "victim" announcing on Day 1 that they don't support the charges would not be accepted very charitably by federal prosecutors.
http://www.amazon.com/Three-Felonies-Day-Target-Innocent/dp/... http://www.threefelonies.com/Youtoo/tabid/86/Default.aspx
I don't understand the legal mechanisms that could lead to JSTOR not showing any public support for Aaron, and if those exist, but I hope they will show some support during the process (as well as the MIT). Gov shouldn't put digital theft in the same basket as physical theft.
JSTOR Statement: Misuse Incident and Criminal Case
The United States Department of Justice announced today the criminal indictment of an individual, Aaron Swartz, on charges related to computer fraud and abuse stemming from his misuse of the JSTOR database. We have been subpoenaed by the United States Attorney’s Office in this case and are fully cooperating. While we cannot comment on this case, we would like to share background information about the incident and about our mission and work with the academic community and the public.
What Happened
Last fall and winter, JSTOR experienced a significant misuse of our database. A substantial portion of our publisher partners’ content was downloaded in an unauthorized fashion using the network at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, one of our participating institutions. The content taken was systematically downloaded using an approach designed to avoid detection by our monitoring systems.
The downloaded content included over 4 million articles, book reviews, and other content from our publisher partner’s academic journals and other publications; it did not include any personally identifying information about JSTOR users.
We stopped this downloading activity, and the individual responsible, Mr. Swartz, was identified. We secured from Mr. Swartz the content that was taken, and received confirmation that the content was not and would not be used, copied, transferred, or distributed.
The criminal investigation and today’s indictment of Mr. Swartz has been directed by the United States Attorney’s Office.
Our Mission and Work
Our mission at JSTOR is supporting scholarly work and access to knowledge around the world. Faculty, teachers, and students at more than 7,000 institutions in 153 countries rely upon us for affordable and in some cases free access to content on JSTOR. Since our founding in 1995, we have digitized the complete back runs of nearly 1,400 academic journals from over 800 publishers. Our ultimate objective is to provide affordable access to scholarly content to anyone who needs it.
It is important to note that we support and encourage the legitimate use of large sets of content from JSTOR for research purposes. We regularly provide scholars with access to content for this purpose. Our Data for Research site (http://dfr.jstor.org) was established expressly to support text mining and other projects, and our Advanced Technologies Group is an eager collaborator with researchers in the academic community.
Even as we work to increase access, usage, and the impact of scholarship, we must also be responsible stewards of this content. We monitor usage to guard against unauthorized use of the material in JSTOR, which is how we became aware of this particular incident.