That's on our roadmap.
> It's vulnerable to implementation changes in the browser network traffic API, though, because the "firewall" isn't a real firewall (just something intercepting fetches and such).
With CSP, we can ensure a certain level of network compliance. It's not perfect but it provides useful browser-enforced protections against non-consented data sharing and exfiltration. CSP isn't a panacea but it's getting better over time. For example, navigation (e.g. clicking on a link to navigate to it) rules could be enforced through CSP's new `navigate-to` directive. Our consent manager's patchers don't yet regulate automated navigation but that is also on our roadnap as well.
We do regulate automated form submissions (e.g. used by the Snapchat ads SDK) to comply with user consent though.
It's vulnerable to implementation changes in the browser network traffic API, though, because the "firewall" isn't a real firewall (just something intercepting fetches and such).
I think it could further be improved by sending a no-op script when the user sends a do-not-track header, which clearly indicates their preference already, saving the power it takes to parse the 30KB of JS and the additional network requests associated with it.