If we're not going to warn folks about unencrypted links where every proxy in the way is a man-in-the-middle attack waiting to happen, why are we going through such contortions to warn them about the same attacks in a situation where they are much harder to accomplish?
I've never understood this warning at all.
While I understand you want to be very egalitarian about it most users would value their personal information's safety over the principle of a completely open web.
In the spirit of the open web you are free to a) not use Firefox b) fork the Firefox project c) file a bug with Firefox d) contribute to Firefox and argue for this feature to be removed
The warning is vibrant because the condition it reports on can be created by an attacker on any SSL connection. That stupid warning might be among the top five security mechanisms on the Internet.
You're assuming all kinds of facts not in evidence. My point was simply that the FireFox tradition (now enhanced) of warning about secure transfers to unverified sites was dumb: it creates a clear incentive for sites not to use HTTPS, so as not to scare their users.
Self-signed certificates are "insecure", if you want to use that word, because there is no way to verify them. If you're Bob sending your certificate to Alice, Alice has absolutely no way to tell if she's seeing your cert or Mallory's.
Self-signed certs get used in non-HTTP apps, and in internal apps, because an out-of-band mechanism (thumb drives, key continuity, etc) is being used to distribute the certificates. If Alice already has your cert, and all you have to do is prove you hold the privkey for it, you and Alice have no problem.
Of course, if you think about this for 5 more seconds, you quickly realize that nobody on the Internet has your cert already, and without Verisign to break the tie between you and Mallory, you're totally fucked.
What should the browser do in this situation? Someone pointed out that an HTTPS connection with an unknown self-signed certificate identifies the site just as well as a plain HTTP connection, suggesting that we should treat both connections as equally insecure: so simply hide the yellow bar.
please, don't try to tell me that users look at the yellow bar
Lets imagine a user who never expects the yellow bar. In the example above, when there is strong evidence of a man in the middle attack, the only warning the user gets is that a UI element which they don't notice is unexpectedly hidden.You really want to warn the user in this situation, so Firefox gives them a big error message and makes them take positive action (adding the unverified, possibly malicious, certificate to their list of fully trusted root certificates) before they can get past it. That is fair enough.
But then there is the kicker. The browser can only tell that a certificate has changed if it has already recorded the old one. It can't distinguish between a site which has always had a self-signed certificate and one which just happens to have one today, unless it recorded the certificate yesterday. So it treats both as man in the middle attacks, which explains why Firefox will always give you a warning about unverified certificates until you verify them yourself.
As suggested by the original article, the correct behaviour would be to treat it as though there's no security whatsoever. After all, logically, how is being encrypted but unauthenticated worse than being unencrypted and unauthenticated?
(1)
A connection to onlinebanking.bankofamerica.com in which an attacker has hijacked the SSL handshake and subbed in a self-signed certificate, and
(2)
A connection to https://login.ratemykitten.com?
You appear to be arguing that the warning for this situation should be tuned to (2).
It's one thing to force users to confirm something whose security can't be guaranteed. It's another to make it so hard they stop using your app. FF3 has other nice security features I can't benefit from at all if I'm not using it.
And StartSSL may be free, but it's not easier than "click the Safari icon".
http://blog.johnath.com/2008/08/05/ssl-question-corner/
An especially pertinent point from his post:
"Several CAs accepted by all major browsers sell certificates for less than $20/yr, and StartSSL, in the Firefox 3 root store, offers them for free."