Now, the idea of "I'm talking to the same person I talked to last time" is useful, but if the users are all conditioned to accept random certificates without understanding, then when they go back a second time (and the attacker is waiting), they'll agree to the new cert, just like they did the first time.
HTTP < Encrypted HTTP < Encrypted,signed HTTP
Unauthenticated encryption is 'better' than a plaintext in just one thing - it protects against passive snooping. Anyone willing to splice the connection will have full access to all your plaintext data and you won't even know about it. As such it's nothing more than an equivalent of reversible traffic obfuscation.
So if your "better" meant "obfuscated", then, yeah, it's better. But it's no more secure (in a conventional security sense) than a plaintext.
Encryption is useful, and separate to identity verification.
You can absolutely do what you're requesting by creating your own CA and signing certs for your sites and distributing your CA cert to your users somehow.
If you can figure out how to reliably provide this service for free you could revolutionize crypto on the internet. You might start by looking at what cacert.org has done to see what problems they've hit and why it's not as easy as it seems.
The business model behind certificates may very well be a huge scam. Unfortunately, the technical model behind having a small number of trusted certificates shipped with your browser is not. Until that link breaks, you don't get security without paying Verisign.
The reason you 'trust' Verisign/Thawte/Comodo/Geotrust/GoDaddy is because their roots are in the OSs & browsers. You can't get in those root stores without a hell of a lot of hoop-jumping. I know this. The money you pay for a cert does go to covering the costs of the background checks you have to pass through before you get the certificate.
Trust has to start somewhere - why not with large companies who have undergone rigorous procedures that also have been vetted by the companies you're implicitly trusting by installing their software?
What you and I are really saying is that a company like Thawte has staked their business on those pubkeys, so that we at least know that if they screw up, they stand a good chance of losing the company.
Webmaster Bob wants to add his key to the server. Bob goes to the server page and hits add key button, puts in an email address for the webmaster, his public key and submits. Then the public key server sometime in the next couple hours goes outs and checks the website itself. If the two match it adds it to the database.
You can have the server require a reverse DNS lookup and also have it use something along the lines of OpenDNS to help secure against fraud. Also if the server itself uses a CA cert to secure data on transit that would also help secure it. Require a revocation key to invalidate self signed keys on the database would also further security.
Then user Joe can add "Self-sign Pub key extension" to Firefox to automate the checking of public keys.
This allows for a relatively cheap self-signing check. Does a minimal amount of is this the real website I'm using but still not quite the level of a paid CA cert that say a bank should have.
(Apologies about the ramblyness of this post)
Encryption should be separate from identity verification.
Of course identity verification should be properly vetted and you should have to pay a fee, and have documents checked etc.
If however, you just want to provide security for your users by encrypting http, you should not have to jump through hoops and spend money.