I think what the comment is about is that the system should be built safer with less security with obscurity but more actual measures. You can (partially) scan people getting onto the plane for bombs etc but it's practically very hard to pinpoint a jamming RF transmitter possibly from kilometers away from ground. Security shouldn't rely on those frequencies being clear.

> Youre expected not to board a plane with a bomb

And we have a lot of controls around this! Congrats! You've discovered airline security!

> expected to not operate equipment on wrong frequencies that interfere with others

If I can build a small electronic device, that goes through no controls, and can cause catastrophic damage, that is a HUGE problem.

> Just because you can do something does not mean its ok to do.

lol, you missed the point. If it's that easy to do something, the system needs to change.

Because aircraft systems are multiply redundant, there is little likelihood of a jammer directly causing an accident.

However, any deterioration in that redundancy is considered a serious safety risk and immediate action is usually taken.

Bottom line: The high redundancy is there to prevent accidents, however any idiot who compromises that redundancy deserves to learn an expensive lesson.

Building jam resistant navigation radios would require too much power to be practical. The real transmitters are too far away.