The reason I think Google should hold itself to that bar is something else: Google itself claims to use that bar. From the horse's mouth [1]:
> This is why Google adheres to a 90-day disclosure deadline. We notify vendors of vulnerabilities immediately, with details shared in public with the defensive community after 90 days, or sooner if the vendor releases a fix.
If they're going to do this to others as general company policy, they need to do this to themselves.
Users still benefit to know about issues that can't be fixed (think about Rowhammer, Spectre and similar), so as these attacks become more practical (eg https://leaky.page or half double) they can adjust their choices accordingly (switching browsers, devices, etc) if the risk imposed by them is too high.
Of course (using an analogy for a second), some can say that it would be better for people to never find out that they are at increased risk of some incurable disease, because they can't do anything about it.
But for software, you can't make individual decisions like that. Even if one person doesn't want to know about vulnerabilities in the software they use, others could still actually benefit to know about them, and the benefit of the many trump over the preferences of the few.
That is, unless the argument is that it's actively damaging for all of the public (or the majority) to know about vulnerabilities in the software they use. If the point is to advocate for complete unlimited secrecy, and for researchers to sit on unfixed bugs forever, then that's quite an extreme view of software security and vulnerability disclosure (but that some companies unfortunately still follow).
Disclosure policies like these aim to strike a balance between secrecy and public awareness. They put the onus of disclosure on the finder because it's their finding (and they are the deciders on how it's shared), and finders are more independent than the vendor, but I could imagine a world in which disclosure happens by default, by the company, even for unfixed bugs.
So the reporter waits >90 days, then publicly discloses. Isn't this exactly how it's supposed to work?
It highlights how divisions operate in silos at Google, and just because Project Zero causes a lot of positive security marketing for Google, it doesn't seem that the quality bar is consistently high across the company.
Also, please don't forget this is still not fixed.