That's actually a pretty good idea. I had a similar idea to discourage the gaming of upvotes on sites like HN and Reddit: make each upvote cost a point, but then you get a point for everyone who upvotes after you, divided by the number of votes the item had at the time you upvoted (or something like that). So people who upvote popular stories early, i.e. people who successfully predict what people will like, get rewarded.

Don't give me too much credit, I stole it straight from https://augur.net/ by swapping "truth" with "justice." ;) Fortunately for me the idea blockchain is irrevocable and my theft cannot be reversed.

But why would we want to encourage such groupthink and discourage dissent?

Taking up the OP's side because it's interesting...

Some kinds of groupthink are bad (like making an anti-vaccine subreddit that only ever shows articles about vaccine-related industrial accidents, instead of a vaccine subreddit that shows people a truly representative sampling of vaccine knowledge), but other kinds are arguably good (not seeing 4chan nasty stuff on /r/reallycutekittensandpuppies.) Only some group content coordination is filter bubbling, while other times it's filtering.

Yeah, this. A lot of good stuff submitted to HN never gets noticed because there's not much incentive to go through new submissions. It's basically volunteer work, so you get volunteer-quality results. The caliber of volunteer in HN is higher than most sites, but a lot of good stuff still falls through the cracks (like most of the stuff I submit ;-)

This is good, but distributing the mining fees evenly across all lawyers will result in too low a fee for the work involved. What if, instead, the parties of the contract would each pick a small set of lawyers ("representing" lawyers) to receive their fees for enforcing the contract. Rather than relying solely on the mining lawyers for this contract to participate in consensus (as that number is now small and adversarially motivated), we would expand the consensus pool to all lawyers who participated in sufficiently similar contract enforcement in the past, using their votes on previous enforcements as an immutable record.

In this design, determining the threshold for similarity may require the participation of a third-party "oracle" or "judge" component.

> Lawyers who predict the consensus get rewarded.

This is incentivizing what they think will be the most popular verdict vs what they think is the proper verdict. That's a very big difference and failures will be inevitable.