When your browser and email provider both support BrowserID:
1. You log into e.g. gmail.
2. Your browser generates a keypair and sends the public key to gmail.
3. Gmail signs your public key and sends your browser a certificate saying "this key is owned by [email protected]".
4. You click "sign in" on some site (e.g. Hacker News) that uses BrowserID.
5. Your browser sends Hacker News an message saying "my user is [email protected]", that is signed with the private key generated in step 2.
6. Hacker News looks at the "gmail.com", grabs gmail's public key (the one that signed your public key in step 3) and verifies the signatures.
Hacker News now knows that you control [email protected].
The process is described fairly well (diagrams and everything) at http://lloyd.io/how-browserid-works
> BrowserID is a decentralized identity system
BrowserID effectively links identity an email service provider, and while I realize that not everyone shares their emails with Google, a vast majority of people still does. That's not that much of decentralization, is it? Practically speaking.
(edit) Added practically speaking... and ease up on that downvoting, distinguished HN comrades. Non-natural post scores hurt my feelings.
Or, in other words: if you don't trust Google, don't use gmail; that someone else chooses to do so doesn't make this system less secure for you.
It's difficult to imagine an authentication system that doesn't have some kind of centralized mechanism for making sure identities aren't duplicated. In this case, delegating that to a combination of two existing technologies (DNS for the domain, then email for the username) that are open, well understood and easy to implement seems appropriate.
What's the alternative? Using some kind of pseudo-GUID and then maybe a derivative of the Paxos distributed consensus algorithm to decide if it is to be trusted? I'd imagine there would be a good number of PhDs in that approach before a system like that would be close to being ready for actual implementation.
This system seems just about as decentralized as is practical. If you disagree I'd be very happy to hear alternatives.
You are right - theoretically this could work. But it would pretty much take a "boil the ocean" approach to make it work.
Browsers would need to implement a secure (private) keystore, and presumably some way to sync that to other browsers.
A whole new standardized authentication flow would need to be created, which wouldn't be the same as the existing certificate-based authentication (which no one uses anyway)
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simple_public_key_infrastructur...
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_infrastructure#Web_o...
This particular ocean should be fairly easy to boil with a browser extension for all popular browsers.
A BrowserID (like an email address) is memorable and secure, but not decentralized (it's centralized in DNS).
A cryptographic key is decentralized and secure, but not memorable.
Systems that are memorable and decentralized, but not secure, don't address these use cases at all.
(And then there's Namecoin[2], which is a fascinating development, but not likely to see broad adoption in the near future.)
[1]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zookos_triangle [2]: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Namecoin
Decentralization leaves the possibility of that situation changing open. That matters.
(Or, less philosophically: there was a time that everyone and their dog were on Internet Explorer. I think we're all glad that we didn't close the door to browsers other than IE.)
Besides, the fact is that most websites already use email, so BrowserID is not any worse than the status quo.
I don't completely understand all this yet, but it appears that what distinguishes the system from one that is entirely trusting of client-side JS code, is the fact that the e-mail provider signs user's key. That means that we must be able to get the e-mail provider's public key somehow. There is supposed to be no central authority, so we must get it directly from the e-mail provider.
Your link includes this line:
> 4. Public key(s) for gmail.com are attained from a well-known location on their servers (specifics TBD).
This service is absolutely necessary to get BrowserID working, but they haven't figured out the specifics yet. I think they need to get beyond that "TBD" pretty darned quick.
If my brain had a replay button, it would say:
* Ok, what if I have multiple accounts? Ahh, nice.
* Hmm it would be cool if it worked like LastPass, where you get great security and only one password to remem... ha, nice, it's very similar!
* Email verification? ....yep, check.
* Can you lock the browser so that nobody can just use your browser to sign in? (No direct answer, but I assume so. Or will be this way soon.)
* Open source? Great.
I didn't really expect any technical answers. But they did mention the blog and there's got to be some good posts coming soon. Subscribed.
The question I do have: why would I use this over something like LastPass which already has plugins for every browser and device most people will ever care about?
Properly implemented, OpenID looks like this to the user: http://springpadit.com/login
And something like this for the average developer: https://github.com/omab/django-social-auth
"Properly implemented", OpenID looks like http://ikiwiki.info/ikiwiki.cgi?page=index&do=edit : a choice of common OpenID providers to help users who don't understand OpenID, an option to use an arbitrary OpenID, and an option to use a username and password.
Properly implemented, BrowserID looks like one big shiny "sign in" button, and yet it still supports any service the user wants to use, and better yet no third-party service at all. Seems like a big improvement to me.
And all OpenID providers have different attribute exchange protocol extensions. If you use them, you can effectively allow only those you have tested.
Have a Google or Yahoo account? Your email address is your OpenID. Of course nobody is going to manually enter an OpenID URL. Why would they need to?
They don't verify e-mail ownership through crypto means - they use the fact that e-mail is identity.
Basically, your mailhost (or a proxy, like browserID) holds your public key, while your browser holds your private key. Now, when you authenticate against any BrowserID auth site, you simply sign with your private key and provide the e-mail address. Since the browser stores both, that's a trivial interaction.
The site then verifies your signature with the mail host. (That's where the asymmetric crypto comes in)
At least that's how I understand it - their explanation is indeed a bit cryptic. Hope they clean it up.
After reading the protocol spec, I have a somewhat better understanding of this. If I got this right, this is basically what this does:
* asymmetric crypto authentication in the backend.
* control over email address == authentication.
* allows a trusted third-party to authenticate the user. This could be a user or a web service (like browserid.org?).
* falls back to regular email authentication we see every day.
I'm still unclear how you can securely verify email ownership thru cryptographic means. Anybody care to explain it?