Adam - "However, with a pure RSA ciphersuite, an attacker can record traffic, crack (or steal) your private key at will and decrypt the traffic retrospectively, so consider your needs."
Matt - "Unfortunately, it also includes a very computationally intensive cipher using an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange for PFS. Sounds scary already, doesn't it? ... The problem cipher is DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA [b]."
The first is factual and straightforward. The second is muddled and clearly skewed towards blindly disabling DHE. I believe we are in agreement that it is irrelevant to almost everyone building on nginx: their connection rates are so low they will not notice the overhead introduced by DHE.
I am sniping at enthusiastic ignorance and encouraging others to behave similarly. I hope that is all quite clear now.
Hugs and kisses, Lil' B
And we apparently disagree completely about DHE, because you appear to be saying you'd recommend it to web startups, despite the fact that the bank that clears those startups transactions isn't even using it.
Especially weird given that Boundary, your startup, doesn't do DHE.
Matt simply says "I messed with my settings and leaving this one out makes it faster", without knowing whether or not turning DHE off is safe (or if he does know, clearly he's making it seem like he doesn't). The fact that it is safe -- in this instance -- isn't particularly relevant. The point is that someone who doesn't understand the security implications of something is making a recommendation about security, just cloaked in a recommendation about performance.
Anyway, I don't know any of the people we're talking about here, just trying to help clear up what I believe benblack was trying to say :)
Recommending people unfamiliar with configuring SSL leave defaults alone is only incompatible with our having non-default config if you are implying I don't understand configuring SSL. I doubt that is what you mean, as I am ever the optimist.
Yay!,
Lil' B
I'm having trouble parsing the rest of your comment. I don't have a religious belief about what defaults are reasonable to muck with and which aren't, but: this particular one is fine to change.
"The win here is that losing the RSA key now only allows you to MITM future SSL/TLS connections. This is still a disaster, but it does not allow you to retroactively unwind previous DH exchanges and decrypt earlier captured sessions."
"If you've lost your RSA key, you are well and truly fucked."
Thanks for clearing that up!
Make love not war,
Lil' B
I agree that both articles have different degrees of technical completeness, but really getting snarky because you believe that someone doesn't have the 'stripes' to write an article that ultimately agrees with the former article you're comparing it to seems to me like a waste of time. Specially since both articles basically come to the same conclusion. It gets worse when you pull two quotes from tptacek that ultimately don't change neither what he said in the beginning nor the reason he's responding to your posts.
The "tradeoff" in security vs. performance you're referring to irrelevant to almost everyone building on nginx. If you've lost your RSA key, you are well and truly fucked. DHE is interesting, but sniping at people for not using it (in your case, implicitly) is unfair.