His claim is that the proposition "This proposition is not provable", formalized as "P equivalent to P is not provable" is not well formed in a typed logic, as "P"'s type is first-order, while "P is not provable"'s type is second-order. Therefore, his claim is that the proposition is simply not well-typed and therefore not interesting. Godel's proofs were discussing an untyped logic, but according to Hewitt that is not an accurate representation of mathematics.
I don't think anyone in the space agrees with him, though, as far as I could tell from some cursory reading.
mathematics with orders on propositions.
The [Gödel 1931] proposition I'mUnprovable is certainly of
historical interest and may perhaps be of philosophical
interest.
However, including the proposition I'mUnprovable in
foundations makes the foundations inconsistent.
Gödel number but did not include the order of the proposition.
then they have the same Gödel numbers.
Unfortunately, Gödel number of a proposition leaves out the order of the proposition :-(
same characters in the same order.
Each proposition is assigned to an increasing prime power, and the increasing list of primes has total order, such that swapping propositions yields a distinct Gödel number.