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Re:Hackers used Slack to break into EA Games by hu3 on Friday June 11, 2021 @04:21PM (#27477964)
This is a concern of mine on systems I design/maintain.

How do I mitigate a stolen cookie from successfully authenticating someone else?

Do I store user browser-agent/IP and check that on every request?

Re:Hackers used Slack to break into EA Games by martinald on Friday June 11, 2021 @07:31PM (#27479776)
I think we are living in a post "IP address" world to be to totally honest.

I can often switch thru many IP addresses in an hour (especially travelling) - various WiFi points, 4G, etc. Services will appear incredibly broken these days if they require a new login per IP address.

Obviously you could force all traffic to be routed thru a VPN and list it there, but it seems people are moving away from that approach.

To me, the better question is how are these cookies get stolen in the first place?

Re:Hackers used Slack to break into EA Games by foxpurple on Saturday June 12, 2021 @01:34AM (#27481837)
IP based auth is super annoying for legitimate users since it logs them out frequently.
Re:Hackers used Slack to break into EA Games by throwawayboise on Friday June 11, 2021 @04:28PM (#27478066)
If it's an internal corporate system where all the users sit at assigned machines and have fixed IP addresses, yes you can do stuff like IP address checking.

Otherwise you probably need short-lived cookies that get renewed by the client in the background, with a hard expiry of some reasonable "work day" length such as 8, 12, 16 hrs. Then even if it's stolen, there's a fairly short window of time that it's useful to anyone.

Re:Hackers used Slack to break into EA Games by munchbunny on Friday June 11, 2021 @08:58PM (#27480343)
As long as your authentication scheme is based on a bearer token, you can't really prevent it, but binding to IP and setting short expiry can help motivate it.

If you want to avoid this, you have to use something in your authentication scheme that can't leave the device/user, so we're talking certificate or other public key crypto based schemes.

TLS mutual authentication is one common tactic for this, although the scenario itself is uncommon.

Re:Hackers used Slack to break into EA Games by josho on Friday June 11, 2021 @05:08PM (#27478523)
In my opinion you don’t. Rely on the authentication provider to handle that responsibility. Services like duo/Okta perform this risk assessment and may opt to request a mfa request.
Re:Hackers used Slack to break into EA Games by bradleydwyer on Friday June 11, 2021 @05:37PM (#27478814)
I've never wanted to completely hand over authentication to a third-party.

Instead what I'd think I'd like is just the risk assessment to be be performed by a third-party when I'm handling authentication (i.e. a third-party that has a broader view of what's happening across multiple services over time). I just send the pieces of information that I'm willing to share as an API call and they make the best risk assessment they can.

Then I can take that risk assessment result and make a final decision if authentication succeeds or not.

Re:Hackers used Slack to break into EA Games by jsmeaton on Friday June 11, 2021 @06:45PM (#27479424)
There are risk services out there.

https://sift.com/ Is one you call out to that gives you a risk score.

https://datadome.co/ can sit within your cdn layer that does risk assessment.

Re:Hackers used Slack to break into EA Games by hu3 on Friday June 11, 2021 @05:32PM (#27478763)
That's not always an option.
Re:Hackers used Slack to break into EA Games by hu3 on Friday June 11, 2021 @10:03PM (#27480738)
You can downvote all you want. Some projects are sensitive enough to not allow third party authentication (military systems anyone).

Besides, if you're large enough it makes business sense to do it yourself anyway.

Re:Hackers used Slack to break into EA Games by staticassertion on Friday June 11, 2021 @10:57PM (#27481075)
If the client device has a TPM or some sort of hardware that can manage the secret you can leverage that. Otherwise, protecting against "attacker has a valid session" is not very easy. Even in the TPM case attackers with code execution on the device can likely bypass it.