Yeah I’d start here, especially the names in the second paragraph.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_philosophy

Also I recommend Blackwell’s Anthology of Analytic Philosophy.

I think the previous poster is being a bit heavy handed about the analytic tradition being the jumping off point. You'll get some mileage with some of Bertrand Russell's non-technical stuff, but there are lots of conversations going on that have to do with historical ideas.

Typically the direction starts with Descartes, then Hume, then Kant, and after that, there is a real break between continental and analytic traditions. So, jumping into Wittgenstein might be a really bad idea for someone without a background, but who knows. The Philosophical Investigations is a fairly approachable book.

I think some of the TLP can be approached almost as a poem. I havn't read it in German, but in translation I think the poetic parts are expressive language, organised into stanzas. That's close to poetry.

You don't need a background, unless you want to read the middle section, which is close to advanced maths.

"the TLP"?

<Googles "works of Wittgenstein">. Ohh, the Tractatus. Ok. "You don't need a background" is absurd! Sure, you can physically read the words. But you won't have a clue why he's saying what he's saying, or what he meant by it. And Wittgenstein himself within a few years would've told you it's nonsense and not to go anywhere near it.

Try Derek Parfit. His book "Reasons and Persons" touches on some fascinating questions (identity) with clear thought experiments that actually reach the level of clarity this article suggests.

I would definitely not say "Reasons and Persons" is clear. It might be precise (I personally don't think so, I think he makes tons of subtle mistakes), but it's at least not clear. It's full of ideas like "rational irrationality" which is at best a poor choice of naming, IMO.

> I think he makes tons of subtle mistakes

That's true of (at least) all important philosophy books, isn't it?

Without context, sure, but when we're talking specifically about the precision of expression, I don't think so. Some philosophers operate closer to mathematical precision than others, and when those sorts of precision-oriented philosophers screw up their precision, it's a bigger problem. In Reasons and Persons, Parfit jumps through hoops to make his statements precise but ultimately trips all over himself (in my opinion).