TPM-based remote attestation doesn't involve SGX at all. If Boot Guard is enabled then you're trusting the ACM to perform its measurements correctly, but that's a not overly large amount of code that can be disassembled and verified.

Sure, you can prefer paper ballots, but that's just one example.

The reason I bring it up is that one of the benefits of open source that is often mentioned is the ability to verify that it does what you think it's doing. Doesn't matter whether it's a voting machine, a self driving system or an ATM or whatever. It's still good for open source to have the capability to do this kind of proving in cases where you want it.

> I think most people would prefer no voting machine software at all

The majority of people, with normal sight and no mobility impairment, may be fine with paper ballots. But for some of us, an accessible voting machine is more than a convenience, as it enables us to independently (and therefore privately) cast our votes.

Keep it as a secondary option then? Or, at worst, have every state or county independently write the software for their machines so they won't all be compromised. A scalable way of breaking an election is dangerous.

Even a mobile app to guide blind users on the ballet would be more secure.

A machine could fill out the paper ballot in these cases.

If you don't trust the CPU vendor, a solution there would be to buy multiple CPUs from multiple vendors, run the same thing on all of them, and compare the results. You would still want them all to have the equivalent of SGX.