I read this as "not (A and B), therefore C", where A, B, and C are logically independent propositions, and not (A and B) is unproven and highly doubtful. Your argument is missing a few steps there.
Housing is more affordable the lower its price. It's unreasonable to price housing below the cost to manufacture that housing. (I disagree with this assertion, but it's implied in the parent comment.)
Therefore, housing is most affordable when closest to the replacement cost.
If a house will never sell for greater than the replacement cost, then it is no longer a good investment. If speculators can push housing above the minimum cost, it is no longer maximally affordable. Therefore not (A and B).
My point is how is a buyer better off under this scenario if they would have to pay the same amount per year in order to have a home? In fact they'd be worse off because a mortgage can be paid off but a LVT cannot. And wouldn't the LVT collapsing housing prices massively reduce the net worth of homeowners? Usually a home is the largest store of net worth that people have.
The key you are missing is that this fixes the incentives. Currently NIMBY's(No in my back yard) say no to new housing so that their home prices appreciate in values. Currently companies buy empty lots and leave them empty for 30 years.
What happens when you have a UBI funded through a LVT? Well, exclusivity drives market values up which drives taxes up. As a result of a LVT you will end up having YIMBY's making sure that there is enough housing in the area, and LVT naturally favors dense apartments over single family homes. That will drive the market price down, and as the market price drops the tax will drop in response to keep the market cost at replacement cost.
The pie gets bigger.
How does LVT favor dense housing? And why would people be building more now that they don't expect the price of homes to ever increase?
I'm not seeing how the scenario you've outlined is the most likely to happen.
Have you played monopoly? It's literally like that. It's a board game where if you land on a square with a house owned by another player you have to pay "rent" but technically it's a tax because landing on a square that is not owned by a player costs you nothing. In other words, owning the house essentially gives you the right to "rob someone at daylight", you're forcibly taking money from someone else and the money manifests itself as the appreciation of your house.
I'm not talking about rent paid to a landlord here, I'm talking about the value that has been forcibly extracted by sitting on the land, i.e. by denying a more productive use of the land. If you live and work near a neighborhood and that neighborhood's land value goes up then a portion of that rise was taken from your own hard work.
Therefore a correction of land prices via LVT is not wealth destruction, because the wealth was not generated by the land, it was generated by people living near the plot of land (they don't even have to live on that plot). What happens is that people get to keep their existing wealth instead of being forced to give it away to a land owner.
>How does LVT favor dense housing?
A LVT is entirely based on the land value of the plot. If you build a duplex, then the tax burden on each unit is half as much vs a single family home. Suburbs have lower land values, which means building single family homes there is viable. Cities have higher land values, which means building apartments will reduce the high tax burden significantly.
>And why would people be building more now that they don't expect the price of homes to ever increase?
If you overpay for land, then you have less money available for building a house. If you want more rental income, you must build more units.
Compare this to classical land value extraction, where you can sit on the land and let it go up in value without building anything. You should rather ask how the latter encourages construction since it offers a secondary income stream that has nothing to do with building housing.
>Yeah I'm not quite seeing how the pie gets bigger.
Land prices are often high because of proximity to employers. If someone builds a single family home on that plot, then that person is essentially denying other people the ability to live near those employers. As mentioned above, the LVT would allocate the land in a way that increases the number of people that get access to these employers, which means more people can have higher incomes.
This would be disastrous for our house, we have a large wooded plot, it would presumably be heavily taxed beyond our means to pay.
A house with a "large wooded plot" is likely in a rural fringe area where pure land values are extremely low. LVT will mostly be borne by highly-productive urban centers that can easily afford it.
I guess I could be open to such a tax but only if I thought I would be able to sell my home before the massive price deflation. It seems like implementation of such a tax would have huge negative economic implications in the short term. Imagine taking out a mortgage on a property, then LVT is implemented and now your home is only worth 50% or less of what it was before. Now you suddenly owe twice the value of the house to the bank.
There are some workarounds, one could grant the property a tax discount equivalent to the assessed market value or pay zero tax for 20 years and then introduce the LVT. However, this would run into a different problem in the short term. The government would not receive property taxes for 20 years, at that point, outright buying the land would be a more appealing option because it is far less complicated.
If you raise the property taxes you aren’t making it more inclusive but really more exclusive. The person hurt by this is the person holding the land when the tax change goes into effect.
In most markets the cost of a home is a factor of interest rates, property taxes, and what’s “left over” - meaning what people are willing to pay each month. When interest rates and/or taxes go up then the “left over” part gets smaller. The banks and government get the bigger slice of the pie.
But as interest rates have fallen and property taxes staying steady then the “left over” part is larger and this benefits the property owner.
This is good.
Inflation adjusted the cost of owning a home is the same as it was 30 years ago in most markets. Interest rates have fallen massively in that time. Some markets (like major cities) have become more competitive though.
Saying "this is good" to such a future is sick.
Why am I mentioning LVT in a Universal Basic Income thread?
What should we do with the money we earn through a LVT? Give it away through UBI.
Win-win.
If you want to start with a smaller LVT and work your way up to equalization over a period of 20 years, that's fine.