It's a gamble. It's easy to point fingers at the company that was caught out, but for the hundreds or thousands that aren't ransomed and aren't paying the extra money for security, they took that gamble and so far they've come out ahead not having spent all that money on prevention.
I'm not advocating that these companies to have less security or not do better on security, but the fact is a lot of them have made the objectively correct decision for themselves, which will continue to be correct right up until they're hit, if they ever are. The whole situation is analogous to health insurance in a way, and the same incentives are at play, along with similar consequences for individual companies and all of us as a whole, as providing easy targets for these groups allows them to thrive and grow and target others.
The criminal penalties for executives in leadership and board positions (and I'm not saying this is my preferred approach) would certainly go a long way toward changing the calculus of this exchange.
One natural solution would be to subsidize cyberdefense. The political difficulty is that a rational subsidy would be proportional to the harm of an attack, which would mean giving the most money to the biggest corporations.
The best solution would be for the firm to raise their prices the very small amount necessary to cover the expense, and for consumers to tolerate the expense because they know it's worth it. But a pipeline is a natural monopoly, presumably charging a monopoly-optimal price that (correctly) assumes a populace ignorant of such concerns until it's too late.
If a business externalizes the cost, does it matter to them?
Civil penalties levied by regulators will drive the change that matters.
I mean, yes? Maybe not before next quarter's revenue statement, but eventually it will have to start to matter?
If your dog goes and craps in the yard every day, you eventually have to clean it up or you will get flies in the yard, and if you have to open the door or leave the house at all then sooner or later you will have flies in the house, it matters, yes. It's really not any more complicated than that.
If you are responsible for dumping toxic waste out the back door of your factory, it's only a matter of time before it's in your drinking water at your house, a couple of miles down the road. Externalizing a problem doesn't really get rid of it, just makes it someone else's problem (for now at least.) Those other people are real people, and they will find you.
> In an apparent industry first, the global insurance company AXA said Thursday it will stop writing cyber-insurance policies in France that reimburse customers for extortion payments made to ransomware criminals.
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2021/05/...
Sadly my experience is that organisations like this will take their $5m ransom (or other remediation cost), assume it's a one-off, then divide it by their number of ransom-free years, and proclaim it was better value for money than hiring 2 or 3 senior security gurus on $300k /yr with 60 vacation days, and letting them bring in a team to deliver meaningful security.
Beyond taking security out of the hands of bean-counters though, I'm not sure how you address this. Pursuing organisations that pay ransoms and prosecuting senior CEO/CFO-type executives for conspiracy to commit money laundering (and pushing for criminal convictions) could discourage paying ransoms. If it's left to businesses as something they can write down as a "cost", I don't see it getting better - there has to be a risk to the liberty of the CEO/CFO before they'll take security seriously in my experience. 90 days in federal prison would certainly sharpen their focus in future.