Some roots in Mozilla's store are trusted for TLS only, some for S/MIME only, and some for both. The blog post is about applications which are using Mozilla's root store to verify certificates which are for a different purpose than the root is trusted for.
For example, NuGet uses Mozilla's root store to verify code signing certificates, which is obviously wrong because none of the roots in Mozilla's store are trusted for the purpose of code signing: https://github.com/NuGet/Announcements/issues/56
Parties like Apple use x509/PKI certificates for code signing. A third-party application COULD use this trust DB for code signing verification. If an application is signed with a (root) cert trusted by this DB, it is allowed.
Mozilla is saying woah: we only validate CA's TLS Server and S/MIME requirements (for CAs in our root DB). They don't validate that an arbitrary CA in their root DB has proper code signing certificate issuance procedures. So this theoretically application is in the wrong and they consider it a high severity vulnerability.
But I agree, there's an open question about _who_ is using the DB this way.