I'm really confused: the pipeline is resilient to a hack: they just shut down the pipeline so it won't be 'affected' (hacked?)?

It was intended to be airgapped, but we're talking about a pipeline that is several thousand miles long, with many pumping stations and delivery terminals. All it would take is one of the SCADA systems at one of those locations to suddenly open a valve and dump petroleum out into the environment to cause a disaster.

Or worse - rapidly open & close valves in rhythm, and the water hammer effect (the inertia of the petroleum in the pipeline) would cause the pipeline to destroy itself. The repair costs would be astronomical - you'd naturally have to repair the damaged sections, but then also re-test all the welds to see if any had been weakened by the pressure pulses.

It was not intended to be air-gapped. These systems generally communicate to business layers through firewalls.

Onion-layer security rather than air gaps. Communication through the firewall isn't supposed to allow control over the valves, but it does communicate both ways (TCP/IP). This is the general practice in petrochemicals, at any rate.

In airplanes, this is dealt with by having an independent system monitoring things.

Think what would happen if the autopilot suddenly went berserk and did a hardover.

It can be already hacked but while power to the valves and pumps are removed then the SCADA system hacks can't cause physical damage.

I haven't seen any evidence that the "OT" side of their network was compromised in a way that would cause physical damage, a la Stuxnet.

And to add it’s perfectly possible that the pipeline networks were air gapped (Ed: which don’t believe them) but you still need to shut down.

I could imagine a situation where information another network (e.g. orders or incoming flows from another customer or user) is necessary to run the pipeline but unavailable to use to operate the pipeline control system.