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Re:The Story of the SolarWinds Hack by cyberlab on Saturday April 17, 2021 @08:37AM (#26843801)
> The routine update, it turns out, is no longer so routine

Is there the rare case that we shouldn't update because the update could contain a malicious payload? If the update gets served over plaintext HTTP I would treat it as suspicious and may even block it from connecting at all. I run the risk of having outdated software, but that can be addressed by storing the software in a machine that's not connected to The Internet in any way, so it can't really do anything/talk to a C2 server (if someone does decide to execute an 0day with the software or inject malicious code via a rogue update).

Re:The Story of the SolarWinds Hack by covidthrow on Saturday April 17, 2021 @10:10AM (#26844382)
Plaintext transport doesn't matter if at least one part of the payload chain is cryptographically protected/verified.

If you have a machine that's air-gapped and its only IO is strictly humans (read: keyboard/screen, not USB or other electronic means) then your weak point is the human, so center your security around that. You can look at security of lottery machines to get a good idea how that's handled.

But if you're updating the machine with updates, then it doesn't really fit that criteria, soooo....