https://www.freedesktop.org/software/XDevConf/x-security-wal...
In Wayland, you make the extension, then you patch every compositor, every toolkit and every application.
In X11, you make the extension, then you patch the X server, Xlib, XCB, every window manager, every toolkit, and every application.
With Wayland, it is only transmitted upon pasting, and only done directly from the copier app to the paster app.
Can you elaborate?
This sounds implausible, wishful thinking since key bindings are managed by individual applications. Whoever holds the clipboard must trust the application that claims to have received a paste command from the user. I don't see anything that could prevent spoofing without just blocking clipboard access entirely or making the usability a lot worse.
In Wayland, the compositor has special standing. For instance, KWin will only allow the currently active window to paste.
There is more information here: https://phabricator.kde.org/T4449#192501
At a meta level, this is probably the most frustrating thing about Wayland: all of its benefits could be realized in the X context itself, even the getting rid of legacy baggage (deprecate parts of the protocol leading up to the definition of an X12).
People actively chose not to do this and instead delayed progress by at least a decade.
Ideally, Wayland would have just served as a tech demo to guide the evolution of X. But as a community, we give too much credit to people working on shiny new things.
”With Wayland, each app only sees their own pixels.”
Out of curiosity, if this is true, how are screenshots / screen recorders implemented? Do they require some special permissions? And if this is the case, why wouldn’t any app be able to acquire these special permissions?
There are solutions to this, which allow finer grained access to screen recording in future, but there are a couple of competing standards right now.
The “good old days” of unencrypted Internet, where everyone could see your cookies, are no longer acceptable; the same is true of X11.
With X11, if you copy a password from your manager, you must assume all running apps now know it and transmitted it to a malicious server. There’s no way to tell.
With Wayland, it is only transmitted upon pasting, and only done directly from the copier app to the paster app.
With X11, everything displayed on the screen is compromised. Also, all inputs, keyboard and otherwise.
With Wayland, each app only sees their own pixels.
With X11, screen locking is pure hackery that doesn’t always protect the locked pixels and… login password.
Traditionally, you are meant to trust that process boundaries on Linux are sacredly secure, which is why Spectre was a big deal. But in practice, that is only true under Wayland.