And subject to attack. Don't want to be recorded? Jam wireless so they can't have anyone sign their videos, then claim they're fake.
Also doesn't work for state actors. A country can compromise three separate signing authorities.
And you can just upload it to ten different authorities in ten different jurisdictions, or even a hundred if you're paranoid. States are powerful but they're not _that_ powerful. It's the same principle that makes Tor work.
I agree jamming wireless could be an issue, but only for prosecution. In the case of proving innocence it's a moot point because this checksum system only covers after-the-fact fabrication anyway.
They'd also have logged the IP, which combined with a time will probably significantly narrow down the individual in question if you can also access telco records. Especially if inadvertently more information is also documented (such as a user agent).
> It's the same principle that makes Tor work.
Tor doesn't work for this kind of problem, unless you are significantly more technically savvy (and even then...) then the average smartphone user.
If someone presents altered footage, you can show that the checksum of the original was uploaded earlier.
This of course only covers certain cases. If the deepfake is crafted from scratch or from a camera that doesn't upload its checksums, and the incentive for the creation of the deepfake arises before the supposed time the deepfake takes place, then this method won't be of use.