The 21st century EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is interpreted similarly:

> For the purpose of this article the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall not include: (a) any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed according to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during conditional release from such detention; (b) any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military service; (c) any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or well being of the community; (d) any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations.

https://fra.europa.eu/en/eu-charter/article/5-prohibition-sl...

See earlier 1953 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Article 4 at https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/European_Convention_for_the_P...

This doesn't invalidate the point, it reinforces it. It's a system that continues, rooted in the structural foundations of the governments of historically colonial/slave-trading powers.

It's not exactly surprising to see an exemption carved out for it in European documents.

It's indeed lamentable that we live in a society where forced community and military service is considered necessary. But it's a tad myopic to believe such constitutional exceptions are rooted in "colonial/slave-trading powers". You're pushing a narrative that just doesn't fit the facts. Just because penal systems were coopted to further discriminatory ends doesn't mean these exclusions are intrinsically rooted in Jim Crow or colonialism. Such a misdiagnosis is a recipe for failure in reform--both regarding specific, discriminatory abuses, and more general abuses that arise from the fact these exceptions are far more deeply and universally rooted in global human civilization. Show me a single country that doesn't impose incarceration, for example? (Incarceration isn't usually an enumerated exclusion simply because, for whatever reasons, it's more typically understood that incarceration or similar deprivation of rights is implicitly excluded from any enumerated right granting freedom of movement. Indeed, the labor as punishment exclusion is presumably more common precisely because societies happen to be more self-aware about the conflict given the relatively recent history in the West abolishing slavery and servitude.)

that provision doesn't necessarily imply maliciousness though. for instance, allowing for prisoners to be required to do work for the jurisdiction, and usually for the prison itself, while incarcerated. it's not unreasonable to expect prisoners to work off their debt to society in some manner (better yet if it develops the useful skills and experience at the same time).

but where that goes wrong is when prisoners are working for private interests for slave wages (i.e., food and shelter) and the difference being pocketed by said private interest rather than going to pay for said incarceration.