Re:Zero click vulnerability in Apple’s macOS Mail
by rnikander on Friday April 02, 2021 @01:04PM
(#26673351)
Okay, so if I understand correctly, the data in those Apple products is not secured, but turning on iCloud on a device does not ruin encryption for other apps that take it seriously. So if I have an app that uses Keychain (end-to-end encrypted) and encrypts it's data properly, it is still secure.
Unless Apple is really bad and somehow collects my keys from keychain, or collects keys passed to CryptoKit, etc., straight out of RAM, and sends them to 3-letter agencies ... if I think that's happening, then I will look for new devices.
Re:Zero click vulnerability in Apple’s macOS Mail
by codemac on Friday April 02, 2021 @02:45PM
(#26674526)
I'm not sure I understand your keychain point. With iMessage you can message others with just your iCloud credentials if you turn it on, and you have access to full conversation history - without needing any particular device keys.
Re:Zero click vulnerability in Apple’s macOS Mail
by gumby on Thursday April 01, 2021 @09:15PM
(#26668219)
> Pixel which encrypt your device backups with on-device hardware encryption.
Can you set up a new android phone from an old phone’s backup? If so, how could this work?
This is a standard way to set up a new iPhone: “restore” from a backup of your previous phone. Especially handy when your old phone is no longer available (lost/broken)
Re:Zero click vulnerability in Apple’s macOS Mail
by glennpratt on Friday April 02, 2021 @02:15AM
(#26669363)
Yes, decryption requires the original device's unlock PIN/pattern/password:
https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-h...
Not that I fully understand how hard it is to circumvent.
Re:Zero click vulnerability in Apple’s macOS Mail
by gumby on Friday April 02, 2021 @11:31AM
(#26672247)
Oh, I see. Apple has done that since the original iPhone too, and I believe iPod before it. I thought you meant they used a hardware key.
The only things end to end encrypted are listed on this page: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303
If you turn on iCloud syncing, basically you're falling back to simple "in transit" and "at rest" encryption.
A lot of iPhone cracks involve just attacking your iCloud account, and then reading all of your messages from backups. This is not possible on Pixel which encrypt your device backups with on-device hardware encryption.