Joseph Heller predicted 2FA in Catch 22 when he wrote:
"Almost overnight the Glorious Loyalty Oath Crusade was in full flower, and Captain Black was enraptured to discover himself spearheading it. He had really hit on something. All the enlisted men and officers on combat duty had to sign a loyalty oath to get their map cases from the intelligence tent, a second loyalty oath to receive their flak suits and parachutes from the parachute tent, a third loyalty oath for Lieutenant Balkington, the motor vehicle officer, to be allowed to ride from the squadron to the airfield in one of the trucks.
Every time they turned around there was another loyalty oath to be signed. They signed a loyalty oath to get their pay from the finance officer, to obtain their PX supplies, to have their hair cut by the Italian barbers. To Captain Black, every officer who supported his Glorious Loyalty Oath Crusade was a competitor, and he planned and plotted twentyfour hours a day to keep one step ahead. He would stand second to none in his devotion to country. When other officers had followed his urging and introduced loyalty oaths of their own, he went them one better by making every son of a bitch who came to his intelligence tent sign two loyalty oaths, then three, then four;"
Notice how 2FA turns into MFA? Keep adding FA until you're as secure as the security theater demands.
"To anyone who questioned the effectiveness of the loyalty oaths, he replied that people who really did owe allegiance to their country would be proud to pledge it as often as he forced them to. The more 2factor logins a person went through in a working day, the more secure he was; to Captain Black it was as simple as that"
"Captain Piltchard and Captain Wren were both too timid to raise any outcry against Captain Black, who scrupulously enforced each day the doctrine of 'Continual Reaffirmation' that he had originated, a doctrine designed to trap all those men who had become insecure since the last time they passed a 2factor authentication prompt a few minutes earlier."
You login to a physical machine with a password (the machine is trusted on the network via AD so physical access is one factor and password is a second)
You visit websites and they use SPNEGO to land on Kerberos or NTLM auth which then bootstraps off the fact you're already authenticated to Windows. You never even need to see a login page
It's achievable with macOS and Linux but afaik there's some more configuration to be done. The only place I saw with a setup like that was a bank and it was part of a new technology stack that almost nothing used yet
With that setup there's almost nothing to phish if you can train people to only enter their password into the OS at login. You can pretty much eliminate the possibility of credential sharing but locking logins to certain machines
Authy Desktop?
Because it's a giant PITA unless you have a dedicated team managing it. And the service companies get this and charge accordingly (aka enterprise levels).
It's why companies like 0Auth get bought for gigabucks.
Not to mention legacy code that only knows about access key ID and secret, and doesn’t have a place to even put a token.
https://aws.amazon.com/premiumsupport/knowledge-center/authe...
The attacker had access to the whole database. Which meant he could alter the 2FA seed. So it wouldn't have mattered much.
So with 2FA they would have had a much harder time to gain access to the database.
The part of changing the seed only matters for customers of the hacked company but is (as far as I can tell) unrelated to them gaining access.
Is it rally cost and complexity?
Or just missing awareness?
Or the lack of consequences when you get hacked in a way which could easily have been prevented (through then they might have attacked in a different way, tbh.).