The template is to get a credentials dump, email the user's email, offer the password from the dump as proof (most people re-use the same password).
I know what you've been watching (no they don't), I recorded you on cam (doesn't matter if you have a camera or not).
It doesn't have to be bullet-proof. It only has to work once to pay off.
I'm pretty confident I didn't have anything personal on there, but just to be certain I wasn't leaking passwords, I did a quick
rm -rf ~ &; disown
Point being: employers have all the leverage over their hardware, and you never know how or when they will use it. Encryption is your friend.Privately, the management had forbade me from fixing the bug. Literally forbade me, and assigned me lots of support work (that didn't have tickets-- it would look like I wasn't working). Then a month later the project manager makes a show of coming over to yell at me in front of everyone for this bug not being fixed.
I zero'd my personal data, walked out of the building and never went back.
That said, I've heard of cases where an ex-employee was sued by their employer for deleting the drive, for example salespeople who maintain contact lists.
I essentially got lucky, but they were a bit concerned when they saw me hastily typing, even though they had already revoked all of my credentials.
I don't remember for certain, but I may have set my password store to be permanently open, which leaves a copy of the encryption key in the user directory.
Really, the practice should already be, "if you have data you care about, then always have offsite backups".
Those hosts usually have fat internet pipes, allowing a bunch of people to download a copy over FTP at once, letting you claim credit for the first rip. There's also probably less of a paper trail; most of the hosts I'm aware of require some kind of ID, and would almost certainly hand that data over to law enforcement.
And I don’t blame them, most of the time it works, even if they do it wrong.