> this second feature (disallowing explicit curve params) was ineffective
Not quite. It would override the previous check about being signed by a valid CA.
I imagine the implementation was something like this:
is_valid = true;
is_valid &= signed_by_valid_ca(cert);
if (check_x509_strict) {
is_valid = !has_explicitly_encoded_curve_params(cert);
}
is_valid &= some_other_test(cert);
is_valid &= yet_another_test(cert);
And it should have been: is_valid &= !has_explicitly_encoded_curve_params(cert);
- if you use the non-default X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag and use the new openssl 1.1.1h feature to "disallow certificates in the chain that have explicitly encoded elliptic curve parameters" and configure a custom "purpose" value in your software then this second feature (disallowing explicit curve params) was ineffective, or
- if you run a TLS1.2 server and renegotiation is enabled then someone can craft a packet that will crash the server (e.g. Nginx disabled renegotiation in 2009 and seems thus unaffected).