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Re:OpenSSL Security Advisory by lucb1e on Thursday March 25, 2021 @01:15PM (#26582813)
So if I understand it correctly, the impact of these two "high" vulnerabilities is:

- if you use the non-default X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag and use the new openssl 1.1.1h feature to "disallow certificates in the chain that have explicitly encoded elliptic curve parameters" and configure a custom "purpose" value in your software then this second feature (disallowing explicit curve params) was ineffective, or

- if you run a TLS1.2 server and renegotiation is enabled then someone can craft a packet that will crash the server (e.g. Nginx disabled renegotiation in 2009 and seems thus unaffected).

Re:OpenSSL Security Advisory by pjungwir on Thursday March 25, 2021 @01:24PM (#26582937)
> this second feature (disallowing explicit curve params) was ineffective

Not quite. It would override the previous check about being signed by a valid CA.

I imagine the implementation was something like this:

    is_valid = true;
    is_valid &= signed_by_valid_ca(cert);
    if (check_x509_strict) {
        is_valid = !has_explicitly_encoded_curve_params(cert);
    }
    is_valid &= some_other_test(cert);
    is_valid &= yet_another_test(cert);
And it should have been:

        is_valid &= !has_explicitly_encoded_curve_params(cert);