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Re:OpenSSL Security Advisory by jeffbee on Thursday March 25, 2021 @12:00PM (#26581906)
I mean, branch coverage could have fingered this hole in the unit tests, couldn't it? The problem is X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT was added in 2004 without any corresponding tests. The project still has decades of debt from past poor practices to pay down.
Re:OpenSSL Security Advisory by tptacek on Thursday March 25, 2021 @01:32PM (#26583045)
I 100% buy that OpenSSL hasn't dug itself out of the hole it was in back in 2012. But building a new TLS library puts you in the same hole with respect to exhaustive unit test coverage, right? You're better off starting from a place where you already have a fairly extensive (if incomplete) unit test infrastructure than one where you're starting from scratch.

This is a weakly held opinion. I'm mostly motivated by the knee-jerk response OpenSSL gets on threads like these; I think those responses are based on a reputation that doesn't capture the level of work that has gone into the project in the years since 2012. That doesn't mean it's the apogee of what we can do with a TLS library.

Re:OpenSSL Security Advisory by jeffbee on Thursday March 25, 2021 @01:52PM (#26583285)
I agree that it is in much better shape today and any competing project starting from scratch would be at a disadvantage with respect to the size of their test suite. However, I also like the BoringSSL approach of forking the project and deleting all the dumb features that nobody needs. They deleted the option flag involved in this advisory, years ago. By deleting it they avoided having to add tests for it.
Re:OpenSSL Security Advisory by tialaramex on Friday March 26, 2021 @04:32AM (#26589911)
Ultimately I agree with you about what the right approach is, but the route there is convoluted. BoringSSL is able to be simpler by defining pretty tight criteria for what it cares about and everything else either doesn't work or isn't guaranteed to exist at all.

I happen to think the safe way forward is to agree that OK then, we can't do all these other weird things, too bad. But this is an extremely unpopular position because lots of people have at least one weird thing they very much want to do.

Re:OpenSSL Security Advisory by est31 on Thursday March 25, 2021 @06:48PM (#26586604)
Ideally at least the integration tests are interchangeable between implementations of the same thing.
Re:OpenSSL Security Advisory by makomk on Thursday March 25, 2021 @12:50PM (#26582524)
I don't see how it could. If they had a test that X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT carried out the intended additional checks, and a test that non-CA certificates could not issue other certificates, and a test that valid certificate chains were accepted, wouldn't that cover all the branches involved without ever detecting the particular problematic combination involved in this bug?
Re:OpenSSL Security Advisory by jeffbee on Thursday March 25, 2021 @01:22PM (#26582894)
I dunno, at least the new release slightly uh, changes?, the coverage.

  ~/openssl-1.1.1i % gcov crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c -bm
  File 'crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c'
  Lines executed:63.20% of 1625
  Branches executed:73.70% of 1194
  Taken at least once:53.85% of 1194
  Calls executed:58.47% of 496
  Creating 'x509_vfy.c.gcov'

  ~/openssl-1.1.1k % gcov crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c -bm
  File 'crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c'
  Lines executed:63.21% of 1628
  Branches executed:73.75% of 1196
  Taken at least once:53.93% of 1196
  Calls executed:58.47% of 496
  Creating 'x509_vfy.c.gcov'
There are still hundreds of never-taken branches in this file alone.

  ~/openssl-1.1.1k % grep -c never\ executed x509_vfy.c.gcov
  520