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Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by tweetle_beetle on Tuesday March 23, 2021 @05:25AM (#26552797)
I remember using a company-mandated pension website which required a very long password with a comprehensive selection of complexity requirements. To log in, the password had to be entered twice, but they had disabled the ability to use a password manager to populate them (I forget the exact mechanism). To me this is the worst of all worlds. If you put people off using your website, you are less likely to have breaches - security through misery.

I wrote to them pointing out the issue and apparently it was put on their backlog for the following year. I think I received an update about it a couple of years later.

Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by EveYoung on Tuesday March 23, 2021 @05:58AM (#26553050)
My broker asks for 4-5 random letters of my password each time, making password managers unusable as well. Thinking about it now, how would you encrypt a password using this method? Create hashes of every combination?
Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by y7 on Tuesday March 23, 2021 @08:01AM (#26554011)
You wouldn't encrypt/hash it, since 4-5 letters (say 30 bits) is trivial to brute force anyway. Talking about offline password encryption/hashing is a bit of a red herring anyway, since it distracts from the fact that you're still sending your full password to the server for verification each time, so if the server is compromised for any length of time your password will be as well. Reusing passwords is broken: you really need different passwords for every service, and then it doesn't really matter whether the server stores them in plaintext.

Asking for random letters is a poor man's version of a zero knowledge proof. It's only marginally more secure than asking for the full password (if you want to break into an account you need to observe someone entering the password a few times instead of just once), at the cost of a very crappy user experience.

Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by jesboat on Tuesday March 23, 2021 @09:32AM (#26554740)
> you're still sending your full password to the server for verification each time, so if the server is compromised for any length of time your password will be as well.

The key difference between storing plaintext passwords and hashed passwords is that with hashed passwords, you can only compromise users who log in during the interval when the system is compromised, and even then, only for worse compromises (eg if all the attacker gets is arbitrary disk read, compromising hashed passwords would be impossible in most scenarios.)

Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by heavenlyblue on Tuesday March 23, 2021 @10:06AM (#26555142)
> users who log in during the interval when the system is compromised

Why only then?

Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by SAI_Peregrinus on Wednesday March 24, 2021 @09:49AM (#26567137)
Because the server doesn't store the password, only the "password hash" of the password. So if the server isn't compromised during the login there's no way for the attacker to learn the password itself.
Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by kevincox on Tuesday March 23, 2021 @09:14AM (#26554572)
A lot of these sites will even change the letters they ask for every time you reload the page. So the number of observations is probably less than 10. Maybe 1 if you have access to decent chunk of IPs (assuming they will block you if you reload the page too many times).
Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by Siira on Thursday March 25, 2021 @03:58AM (#26577469)
Can’t the hash be computed through some browser API? The browser can then visually show when plaintext passwords are being sent.
Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by y7 on Friday April 02, 2021 @06:42PM (#26676704)
If you're willing to rely on client-side code for authentication, there are better mechanisms, such as https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Remote_Password_protoco...

There is a standard for it, called TLS-SRP, but unfortunately no browser supports it.

Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by KMag on Tuesday March 23, 2021 @06:38AM (#26553339)
Nit: I think you mean hashing, not encryption.

Though, my bank uses a dual-password setup where the first password is required in its entirety and a few letters of the second password are required. I suspect this is stored by using a (hopefully memory-hard) salted key derivation function/password hash function (such as Argon2 or scrypt) to derive an encryption key from the first password, which is then used to decrypt the second password.

At least, that's the way I'd design the system to minimize consequences of database compromise. Users are often not creative and often use related passwords. You'd want all of the stored information about the second password to provide clues to the first password only if the attacker had already cracked the first password. Hashing all of the permutations really blows up storage space and DB I/O.

Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by tinus_hn on Tuesday March 23, 2021 @07:42AM (#26553839)
Hashing in this sense is one way encryption.
Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by KMag on Thursday March 25, 2021 @11:41PM (#26588532)
Cryptographic literature often mentions one-way functions, but I don't think I've ever seen the phrase "one way encryption" in a cryptographic paper. It's not a phrase used by cryptographers, except rarely to describe encryption using trap door one-way functions such as RSA.
Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by colejohnson66 on Tuesday March 23, 2021 @06:34AM (#26553317)
You can, but I’d assume they don’t. Plain text all the way!

Ok, yes. Encryption could work, but encrypted passwords aren’t much better than plain text ones.

Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by chedabob on Tuesday March 23, 2021 @06:34AM (#26553314)
Possibly using this? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shamir%27s_Secret_Sharing

I think a lot of implementations don't do anything clever and just have a fixed set of combinations they use each time, so the number of stored hashes is smaller.

Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by KMag on Tuesday March 23, 2021 @06:55AM (#26553476)
I thought about something similar to Shamir's Secret Sharing, polynomial fitting over a finite field, but in this case, information theory is working against you.

With Shamir's Secret Sharing, you start out with your secret expressed as a finite field element, and pick N-1 polynomial coefficients uniformly randomly from your finite field, and give M different participants values of the polynomial evaluated at different points. Information theory shows that having at most N-1 points on the polynomial still leaks no information about F(0). It's as secure as a one-time pad, and in the degenerate case of N=2 over a Galois field, is in fact a XOR-based one-time-pad. The amount of entropy added at generation time is greater than the amount of entropy in the secret.

In this partial password case, you'd want the "shared secret" to be a single value, and construct a polynomial such that, say 4 field elements, would always be sufficient to recover the same "secret". You're running the algorithm the wrong way, and unless you're forcing a password on the person, those letters are actually low-entropy instead of maximal entropy field points as in Shamir Secret Sharing.

I really don't see a way to use polynomial interpolation in this way without leaking entropy. I thought about using something similar to Schnorr threshold signatures[0] to solve the information leakage, but then you end up storing one elliptic curve public key per password letter, and the private key for each public key is a single letter, so trivial to bruit-force.

[0] https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/852.pdf

Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by michaelcampbell on Tuesday March 23, 2021 @09:47AM (#26554891)
There are browser plugins and script-injector-modifiers that help with this. "Don't Fuck With Paste" is one I use.

But yeah, that's infuriating.

Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by mPReDiToR on Tuesday March 23, 2021 @05:36AM (#26552872)
I recently got an OnlyKey.

It plugs in as an HID so that passwords appear to have been typed in, not PW managed.

Useful little thing, it seems too good to be true.

Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by yosito on Tuesday March 23, 2021 @05:46AM (#26552961)
OnlyKey looks interesting. A few things make me skeptical though: It only supports 24 accounts, which is two orders of magnitude fewer than I have in my password manager. And the hardware design doesn't look super convenient or durable. I bought a YubiKey a few years ago, and kept in on my keychain, and before I had even used it a dozen times, the entire thing disintegrated and became unusable.

Edit: I'm also a bit uneasy about securing access to all by accounts by one single PIN that can be used to unlock a physical device that is easy for someone to steal unnoticed.

Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by tinus_hn on Tuesday March 23, 2021 @07:44AM (#26553863)
This means the password manager can’t check it isn’t entering your credentials on app1e.com
Re:Substack's UI and 1Password temporarily cost me $2k by rawoke083600 on Tuesday March 23, 2021 @06:09AM (#26553130)
PeopleSoft ? (Poephol-Soft in dutch/afrikaans) as we used to call it !