>If we can think of something that is not objectively measurable what suggests that it exists objectively as opposed to it being a subjective opinion?
That you prefer chocolate ice cream isn't objective. But that you have a preference for chocolate ice cream is objective. The content of the conscious percept isn't necessarily real, but the fact that you are having what we call a 'conscious percept' certainly is real. Just because it is happening in your head, why should it not be real?
I don't claim to be conscious. I am alive and awake and thinking and sensing, etc.
>Consciousness does absolutely objectively exist, or at least I can say it does for me.
This sentence appears to confuse subjective experience with objective reality.
>That its existence is not objectively measurable doesn't mean it doesn't exist
If we can think of something that is not objectively measurable what suggests that it exists objectively as opposed to it being a subjective opinion?
Can you define consciousness without invoking subjective conscious experience? You agree there is not evidence of objective existence and yet you say it objectively exists because you subjectively feel it does. Is this not self-contradictory?
Are you claiming that subjective opinions do not exist, despite your own observations of your own subjective opinons?
Also, imagine you live in a box with a yellow ball. And you can speak to other people outside your box. They tell you they also live in a box with a yellow ball. You will never have proof that they actually have yellow balls in their boxes. And they will never have proof that you actually have a yellow ball in your box.
Would you say that yellow balls are merely a subjective opinion, and don't exist?
That does not mean its existence is realised or useful. Is it useful (consequential) and consistent that yellow balls exist? If yes, then they do. If no, then they don't.
No, I'm saying it need not be objectively measurable to be real. This is what I mean by empiricism being an incomplete philosophy.