News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Trusted certificate authority Certigna leaks its private key by JoachimSchipper on Thursday June 09, 2011 @05:49AM (#2636537)
Of course, "just revoke" doesn't actually work: serving a outdated certificate revocation list, or preventing a connection to the OCSP ("is this cert revoked?") server causes browsers to trust "revoked" certificates. Worse, lots of software doesn't even bother to do this check. This is why the browsers hardcoded a list of compromised certificates last time.

This is even worse, though, because a lot of "real" certificates depend on this CA. Also, there are no logs to make a blacklist of "bad" certificates, so you can't just revoke a handful...

Re:Trusted certificate authority Certigna leaks its private key by zwp on Thursday June 09, 2011 @06:52AM (#2636650)
"a lot of "real" certificates depend on this CA"

How many? did you estimate from sequential serial number allocation?

I am surprised (even if it turns out this is "just" an encrypted webserver key) that they aren't using hardware keys: (a) it's their core business (b) they appear competent (CTO posts to technical mailing lists) (c) they have a /29 so aren't just a single IP on an inaccessible low-end VPS.

ssllabs.com gives them a C rating.