Lots of them would be happier to get a small amount of money for being just a little bit quieter. People preferring peace and quiet would be happy to pay a small amount of money to get fans of noisemaking to stay below their annoyance threshold.

Rough sketch of a potential process: Harley Q. is riding through the hills with the throttle open when her phone buzzes, indicating she's approaching an area with residents willing to pay above her threshold for <80db experienced noise. She rolls off the throttle and coasts through the upcoming neighborhood, or takes the long way around. Maybe a small extra payment would be put in escrow if she doesn't approach that area while making noise for a few more weeks.

Please note that the apparent bias toward paying the noisemaker is an artifact of existing noise ordinances. Coase can only help us from where we currently are, not from an imaginary utopia.

If we place this in a hypothetical city with a 40db noise restriction, which allows neighborhoods to accept louder noises by consensus, the payments reverse; Ms. Q will try to select the cheapest neighborhood she can enjoy her noise through, and its residents will end up collectively richer in exchange for suffering through the noise.

That's like saying, "I'll stop punching you if you pay me $50, but until then I'm really enjoying punching you." Assholes are assholes and should not be paid to not be assholes, they should just stop it or pay others whenever they cross the line (via fines or other means).

> That's like saying, "I'll stop punching you if you pay me $50, but until then I'm really enjoying punching you."

It's not at all like that, because punching people is currently illegal, and making noise up to a certain threshold is legal. I like peace and quiet more than I like making noise, so I wouldn't mind a lower legal threshold; but the advantage of paying people instead of fighting to change laws is that there's no actual fight.

The advantage of casting things as a moral struggle instead of a difference in preferences is, of course, that you might be able to gather enough allies to defeat the other side and take their stuff.

If I can change the laws first, then the other side will have to pay me. How to decide what's the best "starting point" for a Coase bargain?

The starting point for a Coase bargain is here, now. If you successfully get the laws changed before bargaining, that gives you a different starting point for bargaining.

If you do have the ability to reliably get laws changed at some expense, you should bring that up while bargaining; it will give you a stronger position. You should be able to get a deal that's better than actually spending whatever resource it would take to change the law.

That makes sense to me.

This is an interesting perspective. Can I ask what your background is that exposed you to this way of thinking?

Lots of reading game theory & economics, and saying "that doesn't make any sense," then reading it again until it made sense. The "rationalsphere" is where I read most of it; sites like lesswrong, overcomingbias, putanumonit, and thezvi.

Sounds like a magnet for noisemakers to route their trips through while staying just at or under the annoyance threshold -- a threshold which, with increased sensitivity, may be shifting lower.

You'll note that I already suggested a small additional payment in escrow for noisemakers to stay away for a few weeks or whatever. I also doubt even the most noise-sensitive neighborhoods would be willing to pay enough to make regular, special trips just for noise-profiteering worthwhile. If they were, it would probably approach the strength of preference that they'd be willing to fight to change local noise ordinances and get an enforcement push.

Thanks for the correction, I see it better now.