I view the procedural or workflow aspect as a subset of training. As an example, I always lower the gear and leave my hand on the gear selector until I see three green (gear safe) lights prior to selecting any flaps.
The operating handbook and factory checklists do not require this, but my planning and training has elected this optional workflow/procedure. Why? Because it's incredibly hard to get my airplane to slow down and come down for landing while completely clean (no flaps, no gear). If I use the factory accepted procedure to select approach flaps, I can get it slow enough to land. I've literally never seen a "pilot forgot the gear" airplane sitting on the runway with no flaps deployed.
Example: I have a mechanical system moving fast with enough mass to hurt the operator, so I put the control on the other side of the machine (i.e. machine body between person and the dangerous part), and require the operator to hold a switch "on" for the entire time the machine is moving.
This doesn't make it impossible for the machine to hurt the operator, of course, but it makes it a lot less likely - and it doesn't rely on training at all.
While you can also rely on training aspects like you describe (a good idea!) it's not the same thing.
I don't know aircraft, so I don't know if there is something equivalent but I wouldn't be surprised. Anything you simply have to do with two hands on disparate controls?
The only thing that I can think of that directly work this way are some of the gust locks (to prevent control surfaces from banging about in the wind while parked) are required to be designed so the airplane can’t be started and taxied out with them in place. (That’s arguably a poka-yoke as much as a procedure, but probably still fits.) Mine simultaneously locks the yoke and has a plastic flag that blocks the starter switch when installed.
If the airplane offered a mechanism to inhibit flap operation unless the gear was down and locked (a poka-yoke enforcement of my procedure), I’d decline it/argue against it. In the event of a gear failure or a forced water landing, I want to have the flaps without the gear being safe and, especially for water, I don’t want to have to look up the abnormal/emergency flap extension without gear in a QRH while doing everything else needed while descending for a forced landing.
Generally in this sort of risk analysis there is a hierarchy of mitigation, and the least of them is training. e.g. when you find a potentially hazardous situation, the best thing you can do is design the system so that it can't happen. Failing that, you design in an procedural or workflow aspect that naturally avoids it. Failing that, you put in a system to force the use to confirm or review the action. Failing that, you train around it.
A common sign of a flawed design process is when things get pushed into the "train around it" bucket late in the process, not because they were unavoidable, but because they were looked at too late in the design to effectively make changes.