That the Germans were unable to take advantage of their new tech shows how slow they were to evolve their thinking as well: Had they even a hint of previous (and later) Prussian mobility, the war could have turned out much differently. There is a reason LMG-centric squad tactics were near-universal doctrine.
Disclaimer for the next bit: I'm Canadian.... Arthur Currie took a different approach, saying 'pay the price of victory in shells—not lives'. He emphasized training, mobility, preparation/repair of supporting areas, and rapid deployment of defensive structures, e.g., barbed wire, etc., to protect and defend gained ground against counterattack (at which the Germans excelled). We get a little chuffed about Canada's Hundred Days.
As for trenches, they came in with smokeless powder, and were very extensive and elaborate by the end of the U.S. Civil War.
Currie wasn't always magic, (they don't teach you about his messier, less successful battles, and you'll have to hunt for books about them) and was a profound war criminal by today's standards. In Vancouver in training Canadian soldiers were taught by him never to take a German prisoner unless specifically instructed to do so for intelligence reasons. I'm also Canadian, but I knew I was being taught pure crap about the Canadian army (and nearly everything else) in school.
(Did you know that one of the few if only cases of an ally firing on - and I think killing, but I cannot find the reference - a Soviet in WWII was a Canadian? We'd been ordered to take territory they'd been assigned. They requested our withdrawal. We demurred. We can only guess what they were thinking when they chose to press their case, but it was apparently withdrawn quickly when triggers were squeezed. At least this is how it was described in the one source I came across some time ago and cannot find. This one at least covers the basics: https://www.warhistoryonline.com/world-war-ii/canadian-parat....)