I'd rather geek out about CTR v CBC than harp on the scrypt recommendation. Consider the scrypt thing a friendly style note. You wrote an article about a competitor's insecurities. When you do that, don't recommend they adopt your own cryptosystem unless (like CRI had to do with DPA countermeasures) they have to. Here, it just made you look unnecessarily petty.
What privacy attacks were you thinking of? Call some of them out.
Consider the scrypt thing a friendly style note.
Note taken. :-)
What privacy attacks were you thinking of?
Things like replacing files with malware.
I think the lack of integrity is more important than you're making it sound. There's a lot of situations where a lack of integrity can be exploited to create a lack of privacy too.
But the main reason I mentioned the lack of integrity first is that I needed to mention the lack of HMAC to explain why they had the ridiculous "salted key hash" construct.
If you're going to write an article about how a competitor's encryption is inferior to yours and cast it as a vulnerability report, I'd suggest not recommending your own encryption scheme as the replacement. The scrypt recommendation in this article sticks out like a sore thumb. Virtually nothing uses scrypt.
I think you're misstating what I wrote a bit. I said that scrypt is the state of the art in the field -- which it is -- and that given that Jungle Disk was around before I developed scrypt, they should have used PBKDF2 or bcrypt.