That's not fair. It should sound like this: "the initial attack vector was a Windows 0day requiring 0 clicks, delivered by a USB stick in a parking lot."
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/12/18000...
“Our analysis indicates that these compromises are not self-propagating; each of the attacks require meticulous planning and manual interaction. Our ongoing investigation uncovered this campaign, and we are sharing this information consistent with our standard practice.”
https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive...
You are saying my comparison is not fair because the USB stick actually had a 0 day which implies sophistication, but the supply chain build server was producing code and was also acting as a 0 day, in fact the actual payload appears to be significantly technically complex and custom.
Where do you draw the line between sophisticated and not?
USB in parking lot -> 0day -> horizontal movement 0days -> vertical movement 0days -> Payload delivery.
Bad admin credentials -> compromised build system -> supply chain 0day -> horizontal/vertical movement -> exfiltration of sensitive data.
Are we comparing: [USB in parking lot -> 0day] to [Bad admin credentials -> compromised build system -> supply chain 0day] or
[USB in parking lot -> 0day] to [Bad admin credentials -> compromised build system] or
[USB in parking lot] to [Bad admin credentials -> compromised build system]
We don't know the extent and complexity of [horizontal/vertical movement -> exfiltration of sensitive data] in the solarwinds saga and therefore we have insufficient information to determine its sophistication or not. Meanwhile the vast majority of the people in this post have completely written off technical sophistication that occurs directly after the solarwinds software updates.The chinese successfully pulled this off at Lockheed in the early 2000s
They would get lists of employees who attended various conferences, then email them a trojan saying "hey we met at conference X - here is something for you to click on"
And employees would fall for it.
The malware would TRICKLE out data very slowly so as not to be noticed.
They did this for a LONG time.
At the time, lockheed only had 3 egress points to the internet - and they had 110,000 laptops.
Another attack vector was the same as stuxnet - airgap; attack a supplier in taiwan, infect any USB stick put into the suppliers machines, then transfer once that USB stick was put into the Lockheed machine.
When the ruse was discovered - the chinese removed the throttle and they attempted to firehose out as much data as they could before they were cut off.
Stuxnet "worked by first causing an infected Iranian IR-1 centrifuge to increase from its normal operating speed of 1,064 hertz to 1,410 hertz for 15 minutes before returning to its normal frequency. Twenty-seven days later, the worm went back into action, slowing the infected centrifuges down to a few hundred hertz for a full 50 minutes. The stresses from the excessive, then slower, speeds caused the aluminium centrifugal tubes to expand, often forcing parts of the centrifuges into sufficient contact with each other to destroy the machine."
The solar winds hack is an otherwise unremarkable trojan that spread exclusively due to the bad security measures of solarwinds.
>The solar winds hack is an otherwise unremarkable trojan that spread exclusively due to the bad security measures of solarwinds.
We don't have sufficient information to say what happened after the trojan landed is unsophisticated. All we have is the idea that microsoft benefits from making their attacker seem more competent than they are, which is true.
The APT/Exfiltration work is much more close to the sophistication of the virus that attacked the centrifuges than the bad password. For all we know the hack could have levereaged information gained via kaspersky, telegram, or whatever other software to do sophisticated things much the same way we asked Siemens for their help.
We don't have enough information to make an assessment yet.