The takeaway is that either (a) everyone who touched the Wisconsin project is an idiot, but an outlier in the company, or (b) the failure to execute in Wisconsin is indicative of the general state of the company.
(a) seems like a stretch, given the project's size and visibility. Ergo, (b).
A $1bn increase in revenue would be less than a 1% increase for Foxconn overall. That suggests they're probably willing to bear extremely high costs to establish new sites, as long as those sites will eventually yield significant revenue. Their negotiating tactics here seem short sighted from my point of view, but when you're as large as they are you create your own conditions.
Edit: Like...this deal seems to allow them to operate any of their businesses in Wisconsin. If they decide not to, they burn bridges in Wisconsin, but they wouldn't care about burning those bridges because burning them means they don't want to do business in the state. It seems like all they lose is their negotiators' salaries, small (for them) facilities costs, and whatever general goodwill they lose.
What would have happened if this deal had been done in China?
No one would have reported on the failure. The local jobs numbers would have "jumped." Infrastructure would have been "built." Everyone would have gotten a pat on the back and/or promotion for hitting their economic targets.
The weakness of command-style political systems have always been that they incentize systemic lying.