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Re:Evidence that the FBI can hack into private Signal messag... by Nextgrid on Wednesday February 10, 2021 @07:02PM (#26096521)
To defend against on-device attacks or iCloud backups, Telegram would need to do its own, separate encryption of its storage and prompt the user for a passphrase at app launch.

The typical security model for iOS apps assumes that the local device is secure, as its storage is already encrypted by the system based on its passcode/biometrics (on initial power-up biometrics aren't available).

End-to-end encryption within chat apps typically refers to encryption over the network. It does not include encryption of messages once they reach their intended recipients.

Re:Evidence that the FBI can hack into private Signal messag... by JimDabell on Wednesday February 10, 2021 @09:32PM (#26097564)
> To defend against on-device attacks or iCloud backups, Telegram would need to do its own, separate encryption of its storage and prompt the user for a passphrase at app launch.

This isn’t quite correct. iOS applications can exclude files from iCloud backups.

Re:Evidence that the FBI can hack into private Signal messag... by saagarjha on Thursday February 11, 2021 @04:46AM (#26099814)
This would still fail to preclude an on-device attack.