Businesses need lower cost because they are under price pressure. Especially with small utilities. Remote access is one of those ways to lower their costs on personnel or vendor support.
There is still a whole lot of low hanging fruit in automation for improving security and access control. We're not going to get it from Rockwell for sure though.
Just so I am clear, doing what you say they are doing should be so unacceptable that it is not even viewed as an option. Anybody attempting to do so should incur costs so great that there would be no competitive advantage to offloading risk to society to the detriment of the people as the costs of doing so outweigh the benefits. If that prevents businesses from making certain profitable decisions due to the collateral damage they will cause then that seems like their problem.
So right now things the op posted are pretty much standard practice everywhere in most industries. I mostly work in EU, I have worked with construction companis, medical companies, hospitals and telcos, and practice like this is standard.
They will have some ungodly expensive security product that makes them change password ever 14 days, and makes intranet barely usable, but will have holes the size of the mountains in their infrastructure, because of this vendor or that cost savings etc.
When downtime is expensive, the pressure from the business is to err on the side of being able to get experts in to troubleshoot the system as easily as possible, vs guaranteeing that bad guys can't get in. The first they see all the time, and the second seems unreal until it actually happens...
[0] https://literature.rockwellautomation.com/idc/groups/literat...
The risk of adding remote access to critical systems is the introduction of globally accessible single-point-of-failures. Given the nature of software, such an attack has an unlimited amount of time to be perfected before deployment and when finished can be deployed at effectively zero cost and complete in effectively zero time which provides no meaningful way to respond except with already deployed automated systems. So, the risk added with remote access is the risk of malicious catastrophic total system failure.
In this case, the water treatment facility treated the water for ~15,000 residents. In a similar case many years ago [1], a similar event occurred to a water treatment facility that treated the water for ~12,000 residents which resulted in 100 affected individuals before the effects were detected. So, we can reasonably assume that undetected water treatment tampering on a facility serving ~10,000 individuals will result in about ~100 affected individuals before the effects are detected. If there exists a way to tamper with a water treatment facility that would result in deaths for the affected individuals, which is quite likely, then that means the risk of remote access to the water treatment facility is ~100 deaths. So, as a society, we should ask the question: What is the standard of care that should be applied to a system where failure may result in the deaths of 100 people? And any business that wishes to add remote access to such a system must demonstrate to the satisfaction of society that they are taking that degree of care. It is not the role of society or the people to suffer for the convenience of business.
And in this case, I am certain that they are not taking an appropriate amount of care. The fact that you honestly suggested that an IT department would shove an AP in the ceiling for their convenience shows just how low our expectations are. In any other industry, such an act would be, in no uncertain terms, criminal negligence. That our standard assumption about the standard of care taken is criminal negligence shows just how far any of these companies is from actually deploying systems that have external access and have adequate security.
[1] https://www.spencerma.gov/sites/g/files/vyhlif1246/f/uploads...