Re:ProtonMail, Tutanota urging EU to reconsider encryption r...
by rakoo on Thursday January 28, 2021 @08:23AM
(#25941413)
Look at the existing cases of terrorism. All of them used unencrypted forms of communication: shared Gmail account, phone calls, even good old SMS. The issue is not that police can't see what those people are doing, none of the perpretators are unknown; it's that they (and the judiciary branch) don't have enough resources to really tackle them.
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Re:ProtonMail, Tutanota urging EU to reconsider encryption r...
by koonsolo on Thursday January 28, 2021 @10:54AM
(#25943799)
I partly agree with you.
But right now, it's pretty easy to use end-to-end encrypted forms of communication, so why still use sms?
Knowing the suspects and having limited resources, seems to me a argument for listening into communication, not an argument against it.
Re:ProtonMail, Tutanota urging EU to reconsider encryption r...
by rakoo on Thursday January 28, 2021 @01:30PM
(#25946511)
I'm not exactly an expert on the issue, but I could imagine that they use sms because that's the only available form of communication on an anonymous $10 dumbphone, and any computer connected to the internet can connect to a webmail.
Listening to more communications is exactly a resource problem: it isn't exactly cheap to build and maintain the infrastructure to gather and analyze more. Moreover in the context of the link, while I'm not a fan of conversations being listened on by default, I certainly don't want resources be spent so that encryption can be reduced