Because according to what I saw presented in hearings, the reading machines actually read the QR code made by ballot-marking-device, not the human readable portion of the ballot.
If true, that seems an obvious design flaw (to be nice) right there.
But regardless of the above -- the design change to include printed ballots was a big improvement in security and voter confidence in the election.
The QR code could mis-match the printed ballot on say 5% of the ballots and nobody would notice a thing.
Need a recount? Ok, just run em through again, and they'll read the same (wrong) votes again, no problem.
Only a hand count of the paper ballots would catch the mis-match.
Did that actually happen? I don't know. But if the machines are truly reading a QR code, that seems a glaring flaw regardless.
Probably as many as review their grocery store receipts, I'd guess. Which is to say, practically none.